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JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD
CONFRONTING ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT:
A VIEW FROM THE REPORTED DECISIONS
Judith A. McMorrow, Jackie A. Gardina& Salvatore Ricciardone*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last 20 years, a rich body of literature has emerged to
describe the increasingly complex system of lawyer regulation in the
United States.' Lawyers are regulated through norms of conduct
established and enforced by the bar, judges in litigation, and
administrative agencies; through substantive laws that apply to lawyers,
malpractice standards, best practices imposed by insurance companies,
and more. While the judge's role has been explored through the lens of

particular subject areas (such as conflicts of interest) or through an
analysis of the court's power to sanction, we still have much to learn
about judicial attitudes and approaches toward the judge's own role in
regulating attorney conduct.2 The goal of this article is to study the

* Judith A. McMorrow is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. Jackie A.
Gardina is a Visiting Professor at Vermont Law School. Salvatore Ricciardone, J.D., is a Ph.D.
candidate at Boston College Lynch School of Education. The authors appreciate the excellent
research assistance of Dominic Gomez and Jerry Kazanjian. Prof. McMorrow expresses her thanks
for the generous research support provided by Boston College Law School Fund in support of this
article.
1. See generally Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who
Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167
(2003); Symposium, Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 33
(1996); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992).
2. See Randall T. Shepard, What Judges Can Do About Legal Professionalism, 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 621 (1997). "Judges write rules of procedure and professional responsibility, and
lawyers and non-lawyers alike look to judges for models of integrity, civility and professionalism.
Still, the profession, the bench, and the academy have largely failed to articulate a clear judicial
role." Id. at 622. See generally Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial
Role, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 71 (1996); John M. Levy, The Judge's Role in the Enforcement of
Ethics-Fear and Learning in the Profession, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95 (1982); Fred C.
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available data from the Code of Judicial Conduct and federal and state
court opinions to glean a richer understanding of how judges construct
their individual and institutional role in this web of attorney regulation.
We begin with a premise that judges are very important actors in
legal ethics. State Supreme Court justices are empowered to regulate the
profession and serve as the gatekeepers in issuing licenses to practice
law.3 State Supreme Court justices take this structural role very seriously
and see themselves as important not just in running the disciplinary
apparatus, but also in establishing aspirational norms of
professionalism. 4 This article explores the more specific role of
individual trial and appellate court judges in addressing and establishing
norms of conduct for lawyers in litigation.5
It is important to understand how judges construct their role in
regulating attorney conduct because judges are the primary regulators of
litigation conduct. While much of the litigation action occurs outside the
courtroom, judges set the norms for that out-of-court litigation conduct
through the signals that they send and the sanctions they impose for
conduct that occurs during pretrial conferences, discovery motions, and
other pre- and post-trial activity.6
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, FederalCourtAuthority to Regulate Lawyers. A Practicein Search of
a Theory, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1303 (2003).
3.

See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 3.1 (1986). Most state supreme

courts fulfill this role by delegating the specific authority to state bar associations (in states with an
integrated bar) or through a separate agency. See generally Barton, supranote 1, at 1249.
4. See, e.g., CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON LAWYER
CONDUCT AND
PROFESSIONALISM
(1999)
available at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/natlplan/

NatlActionPlan.html. See also E. Norman Veasey, Ethics 2000: Thoughts and Comments on Key
Issues of ProfessionalResponsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 5 DEL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002).
Our objective [in Ethics 2000 revision of Model Rules of Professional Conduct] was also
to resist the temptation to preach aspirationally about "best practices" or professionalism
concepts. Valuable as the profession might find such guidance, sermonizing about best
practices would not have-and should not be misperceived as having-a regulatory
dimension. There are other vehicles for accomplishing that noble objective [such as the
Conference of Chief Justices' National Action Plan on Professionalism].
Id.
5. One would anticipate that this structural role in regulating the legal profession would
potentially influence a state supreme court justice's vision of the judge's role in regulating attorney
conduct during litigation. As discussed in detail in Part IV infra, we could not discern a significantly
different attitude toward regulating attorney conduct in state court opinions. Those differences may
exist, but they were not strongly evident in the written opinions.
6. While it appears that actual trials are on the decline, lawsuits continue to be filed in a
robust fashion in the United States. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 142-43 (2002) (describing decline of the civil trial);
Chris Guthrie, ProceduralJustice and the Paucity of Trials, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 127, 128-29
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Judges have a panoply of procedural and substantive rules to
address attorney conduct issues that arise in litigation. For example, in
federal courts judges may rely on Rule 11 and Rule 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as various discovery rules, to establish
norms of conduct and impose sanctions.7 Judges can supplement these
rules with their own creative responses using the court's inherent power,
a subject addressed in greater detail below. 8 State judges have a similar
variety of rules and inherent powers. 9 These rules and the inherent power
doctrine give judges the power to regulate attorney conduct, but we do
not fully understand what motivates a judge to use these powers.' 0 What
visions do judges hold of the court's role in the mosaic of regulating
attorney conduct? Judicial motivation is typically studied to understand
why a judge decides cases in a certain way." Penetrating judicial
motivation when regulating attorney conduct can be particularly
challenging. We can envision several possible motivations. Judges are
likely to be very concerned about the limits of their power or other
aspects of their institutional role. Efficiency concerns are likely to be a

(2002). Courts have the ability to sanction out-of-court conduct. See infra Part II and Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991) (upholding federal court authority to sanction conduct,
including conduct that occurred outside the courtroom).
7. For an excellent development of the rule-based sanctions, see GREGORY P. JOSEPH, THE
FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE (3d ed. 2000).
8. See JUDITH A. MCMORROw & DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE FEDERAL LAW OF
ATTORNEY CONDUCT, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 807 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter MCMORROW
& COQUILLETTE]; Zacharias & Green, supranote 2, at 1342-51.

9. See infra Part IVA.
10. See Shepard, supra note 2, at 621 ("Judges strive to do justice, but we reveal little about
how we function."). See generally Mareen Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion: Sanctions and
the Conundrum of the Close Case, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 493 (1997).
11. Most empirical work on judicial behavior has focused on the United States Supreme
Court. See Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial
Behavior, 68 U. GIN. L. REv. 615, 621 (2000). More recent studies have examined the behavior of
trial court judges, typically federal court judges. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg,
& Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case
Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258-60 (1995) (studying dockets in three federal trial courts that
randomly assign judges, authors found little evidence that the characteristics of the judges or
political party of the appointing president was a significant predictor of judicial decisions); Sue
Davis, Susan Haire & Donald R. Songer, Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129, 130 (1993) (describing empirical research on the behavior of women
decision-makers). See generally Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting
the Influences on the JudicialMind: An EmpiricalStudy of JudicialReasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1377 (1998) (studying federal lower court decisions which analyzed the constitutionality of federal
criminal sentencing guidelines).
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dominant factor. 12 In states with an elected judiciary, election pressures
are perceived to influence a judge's actions on the bench. 13 Judges may
be concerned about collegiality among the judges on their court and/or
for one's reputation as a fair-minded judge.14 Judges may also be
cognizant and protective of the reputation of the attorney whose conduct
is being questioned. 15 These concerns may be very hard to ascertain
from written opinions, particularly since the very concerns of efficiency,
collegiality and reputation may encourage a judge to be silent or do
nothing. We would predict that the process of writing itself would reveal
slower and more reflective thought processes, rather than the immediate,16
often reactive, response of a judge in the course of litigation.
Consequently, we would anticipate that the written record leaves a trail
from which we can discern a partial, and potentially distorted, picture of
judicial attitudes toward regulating attorney conduct in litigation.
While there is obviously no single vision of the judicial role in legal
ethics, what we have discovered are glimpses of attitudes. One needs to
examine the cases for what the courts say, what conduct they choose to

12. See generally Herbert Jacob, The Governance of Trial Judges, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 3
(1997). See also Zacharias & Green, supra note 2, at 1360 ("efficient allocation ofjudicial resources
militates in favor of district courts confining themselves to adjudicating questions of professional
misconduct that can be resolved without resort to an independent fact-finding mechanism.").
13. See generally Peter A. Joy, A Professionalism Creed for Judges: Leading by Example, 52
S.C. L. REV. 667 (2001).
14. See generally In re Voorhees, 739 S.W.2d 178, 187 (Mo. 1987) (discussing that without
Canon 3B(3) judges may be tempted to avoid "rocking the boat," but not "every failure to inform
about well-publicized misbehavior of a fellow judge" is misconduct); Leslie W. Abramson, The
Judge's Ethical Duty to Report Misconduct By Other Judges and Lawyers and Its Effect on Judicial
Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751, 780 (1997) ("Understandably, what judge would want the
reputation of a snitch?"); Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision
Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003) (summarizing theories of influences on judicial decision
making); Schauer, supra note 11, at 620-21. Reputation is a multifaceted subject, a full exploration
of which is well beyond the scope of this article. Reputation concerns may include a desire to avoid
controversy if the judge is subject to reelection, a desire for influence in the legal academy, a desire
for influence in the local or state bar, and the like. Reputation may have the more genial goal of
serving as confirmation that the judge is actually a fair-minded and fair-acting arbiter.
15. Judges may agree with Justice Stevens' factual assessment that "[d]espite the changes that
have taken place at the bar since I left the active practice 20 years ago, I still believe that most
lawyers are wise enough to know that their most precious asset is their professional reputation."
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 413 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part).
16. Cf David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 509, 514 (2001) ("An ethical judge must demand of herself that she identify and
understand her own biases and how they affect her reaction to a case. Writing opinions has an
important role in this effort."); Cass R. Sunstein, HazardousHeuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 754
(2003).
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sanction, and the nature of the sanction imposed. We have found a
handful of reported decisions touching on the Code of Judicial Conduct
and a larger body of federal and state court cases discussing, often
indirectly, the judge's role in regulating attorney conduct. The picture
that emerges from the reported decisions in both state and federal courts
is a desire to maintain the integrity of the judicial process and a concern
for the efficiency and fairness in the proceeding before the court.
Concern for the integrity of the legal profession as an independent
concern appears to play a lesser role in judges' attitudes, at least as
reflected in the reported decisions. There is an obvious connection
between the legal profession and the judicial system, but regulating
attorney conduct is derivative or secondary to the larger goals of a fair
and efficient legal proceeding. This picture of judicial attitudes toward
confronting attorney misconduct appears to reflect a seasoned and
thoughtful assessment of the institutional capabilities ofjudges.
As often happens with in depth research, the more we learn, the less
we know. This research suggests that the reported decisions cannot
answer some of the most compelling questions about judicial attitudes
toward legal ethics. The reported decisions do not provide a systematic
and reliable picture, beyond anecdotes, of the ethical issues that arise in
the courtroom. They do not provide a well-developed description of the
informal mechanisms used by judges to address ethical issues in their
courtrooms or reveal why judges exercise their significant drafting
power to sometimes comment on attorney conduct in written opinions
issues informally. These
and other times choose to deal with the conduct
17
issues await a more in depth empirical study.
II.

THE JUDGE'S ETHICAL OBLIGATION TO ADDRESS
ATTORNEY CONDUCT ISSUES IN THE COURTROOMTHE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

A.

Overview of JudicialEthics Obligation

It is well acknowledged that judges "are held to higher standards of
integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys or other persons not invested

17. In the interests of full disclosure, Judith McMorrow is in the midst of an "access study,"
interviewing ten to fifteen judges to identify judicial attitudes toward regulating attorney conduct.
The authors hope to undertake a much more rigorous study to explore the issues identified in this
article.
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with the public trust."' 8 It is less clear, however, whether that heightened
standard includes a heightened obligation to address attorney ethics
issues. One can envision a judge's role ranging from a benign observer
to an active participant in attorney regulation.
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which serves as the template
for disciplinary norms for state judges and for the applicable code of
conduct for federal judges, begins with the overarching obligation to
uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. 19 This duty
drives from the judiciary's central role in our legal system.2 ° Canon 3
makes clear that the judge's judicial duties "take precedence over all the
judge's other activities.",2 1 The 1972 version of the Code divided the
judge's core functions into adjudicative and administrative functions, the
latter of which included a provision that judges should address judicial
and attorney misconduct.22 Canon 3 of the 1990 version of the Code
sharpened the focus of the judge's ethical responsibilities by dividing the
judge's judicial duties into three core functions: adjudicative
responsibilities (3B), administrative responsibilities (3C) and
disciplinary responsibilities (3D). 23
18. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, STEVEN LUBET & JAMES J. ALFINI, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND
ETHICS § 1.01 (3d ed. 2000) (citing In re Piper, 534 P.2d 159, 164 (Or. 1975)) [hereinafter
SHAMAN]. See Hayes v. Alabama Court of the Judiciary, 437 So. 2d 1276, 1278 (Ala. 1983); In re
La Motte, 341 So. 2d 513, 517 (Fla. 1977); In re Troy, 306 N.E.2d 203, 235 (Mass. 1973); Leslie
W. Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code of.Judicial Conduct, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 949, 960 n.35 (1996);
David Cleveland & Jason Masimore, The Ermine and Woolsack: Disciplinary Proceedings
Involving Judges, Attorney-Magistrates, and Other Judicial Figures, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1037, 1044-45 (2001).
19. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (1990); CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/chl.html. See
generally Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality
"Might Reasonably Be Questioned," 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55 (2000). Federal judges are
subject to sanction for engaging in conduct "prejudicial to the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts." 28 U.S.C. § 35 1(a) (2004). This statute is not intended
to enforce the Code of Judicial Conduct, which functions as aspirational as to federal judges. In re
Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 62 F.3d 320, 322-23 (9th Cir. 1995) ("This is not to say the Canons
are not important. They are. As a judiciary, we should do all we can to educate and motivate judges
to achieve the aspirational goals of the Canons. But the judicial misconduct procedures were not
meant to be nor are they designed to enforce those goals."); In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 91
F.3d 1416, 1418 (1Oth Cir. 1996).
20. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Pmbl. (1990) ("Our legal system is based on the
principle that an independent, fair and competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that
govern us.")
21. Id.atCanon3A.
22. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1972).
23. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1990). The Canon 3 admonition that
"A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently," provides five
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While both the 1972 and 1990 versions of the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct envision disciplinary responsibilities as one aspect of
the judge's role, the content of those responsibilities has not been
thoroughly delineated. Canon 3B(3) of the 1972 ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct identified the judge's disciplinary responsibilities to
"take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against a judge or
lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become
aware." 24 Some states edited the language to expand on the obligation,
but the language obviously leaves ample room for interpretation. The
1972 version did not distinguish between degrees of misconduct and did
not expressly address what constitutes "appropriate disciplinary
measures" and when disciplinary action would be appropriate.2 5
The 1990 Code offered somewhat better guidance by
acknowledging the obligation to address misconduct of judges and
lawyers. As to lawyers, Canon 3D(2) of the 1990 Code provides that:
A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood
that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct should take appropriate action. A judge having knowledge
that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct that raises a substantial question as to the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness
26 as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the
appropriate authority.
The commentary offered one slender paragraph of additional
insight. "Appropriate action may include direct communication with the
judge or lawyer who has committed the violation, other direct action if
available, and reporting the violation to the appropriate authority or
other agency or body." 2 7 This commentary makes clear that reporting to
the bar is not the exclusive sanction for misconduct.2 8 Section 3D(3)
categories of responsibility of a judge: judicial duties in general, adjudicative responsibilities,
administrative responsibilities, disciplinary responsibilities and disqualification. Id. See also
Cleveland & Masimore, supra note 18, at 1039-40; Brian Holland, The Code of JudicialConduct
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: A Comparison of Ethical Codes for Judges and
Lawyers, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 725, 732-33 (1989).
24. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(3) (1972).
25. Alex Rothrock, Ex Parte Communications with a Tribunal: From Both Sides, 29 COLO.
LAW. 55, 60 (2000).

26. The term "knowledge" "denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's
knowledge may be inferred from circumstances." The term "appropriate authority" "denotes the
authority with responsibility for initiation of disciplinary process with respect to the violation to be
reported." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (1990).
27.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3D(2) cmt. (1990).

28. See Abramson, supranote 14, 761-62.
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reinforces the idea that disciplinary actions, including appropriate
response and reporting, are part of the judicial duties and provides that
disciplinary activities are absolutely privileged.29
B. Informal Approaches: AppropriateAction
Section 3D divides the judge's obligation into formal and informal
approaches. Information about a violation of the applicable rules of
conduct triggers only the suggestive language that the judge "should take
appropriate action." This language essentially punts to judicial
discretion. The option to act ("should") and the flexible response
("appropriate action") are so open-ended as to offer no meaningful
guidance to judges as to the judge's ethical obligation. State courts
occasionally cite 3D as support for a duty to address attorney
misconduct. 30 Federal courts also occasionally look to the comparable
provision of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges to justify
their decisions concerning alleged attorney misconduct.31 While the
commentary to the Code of Conduct for United States Judges suggests
direct communication and other direct action, these same actions are
typically authorized by the rules of court and the judge's flexible
inherent powers. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges may

29. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3D(3) (1990) ("Acts of a judge, in
the discharge of disciplinary responsibilities, required or permitted by Sections 3D(1) and 3D(2) are
part of a judge's judicial duties and shall be absolutely privileged, and no civil action predicated
thereon may be instituted against the judge.").
30. Cf Couch v. Private Diagnostic Clinic, 554 S.E.2d 356, 362 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)
("inherent authority encompasses not only the power but also the duty to discipline attorneys, who
are officers of the court, for unprofessional conduct") (citing In re Hunoval, 247 S.E.2d 230, 233
(N.C. 1977)).
31. See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 212 F.R.D. 14, 23-24 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that "because
not every violation of the ethics rules deserves punishment, there remains the question as to whether
this matter warrants a referral to the Disciplinary Panel for further proceedings" but referral to the
District Court's Committee on Grievances is appropriate in this case because counsel was aware
that contact with class members was questionable but did not seek advance approval by stating,
"[i]n the face of such misconduct, it would be an act of negligence for this Court to stand idly by.").
The Code of Conduct for United States Judges was adopted by the Judicial Conference of the
United States in 1973 and has been updated periodically. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34, 111 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Code of Conduct for United States Judges still uses the older
3B(3) formulation that "[a] judge should initiate appropriate action when the judge becomes aware
of reliable evidence indicating the likelihood of unprofessional conduct by a judge or lawyer."
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/

vol2/chl .html (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
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also provide independent justification to explore ethical violations of
court officers.32
The very openness of this Canon 3D(2) language suggests that a
response to professional violations might constitute "best practices" for a
judge and be wise use of the judge's discretion.33 It is not evident,
however, that it rises to the level of an ethical obligation. The openness
and looseness of the language is likely one reason why some states
elected to drop this language from their state versions of the Model Code
and instead included only the second, mandatory reporting as part of
judicial ethics obligation.34 Some states that have dropped this unguided
discretionary language for less significant professional lapses for
lawyers, however, have retained parallel language as it applies to
judges.35 In those jurisdictions, judges have a heightened ethical
obligation to respond to professional violations of judges than lawyers.
C. JudicialEthics Obligationto Report to the Bar
The second prong of the judge's "disciplinary responsibilities" as to
lawyers requires that a judge with knowledge "that raises a substantial
question as to the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate authority. 3 6 This
language parallels the mandatory reporting obligation of lawyers.37 This
language appears to have been included in state versions of the Code of
Judicial Conduct with somewhat less controversy than similar language
in the lawyer's code, suggesting that the judge's obligation to report was
seen on an instinctive level as more compelling-or at least causing less
collateral damage-than a lawyer's obligation.38 It is important to note
32. See Granholm v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 625 N.W.2d 16, 21 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000)
("Pursuant to our independent responsibility to supervise the ethical conduct of our court officers,
this Court has raised and now addresses the issue whether the Attorney General's dual roles in this
case as both the party appellant and as counsel for appellee PSC constitute an impermissible conflict
of interest.").

33.

This insight came through discussions with two members of the committee that proposed

the most recent Massachusetts Code of Judicial Conduct.
34. See, e.g., MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3D(l) (2003).

35. See id. at Canon 3D(2).
36. Forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Judicial Conference use either
the 1972 or the 1990 versions of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct as the template for their
applicable Codes, with some local tailoring. SHAMAN, supra note 18, at § 1.01.
37. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (2002); see also Abramson,
supranote 14, at 763-66.

38. The lawyer's duty to report has generated a good deal of discussion. See, e.g., Bruce A.
Campbell, To Squeal or not to Squeal: A Thinking Lawyer's Guide to Reporting Lawyer
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that since most judges are also lawyers, judges might also be required to
report knowledge of misconduct under the applicable rules for lawyers.39
Professor Leslie W. Abramson's authoritative article on the
reporting obligation of judges canvasses the subtle modifications that
some states have made to Canon 3B(3) of the 1972 version of the Code
and Canon 3D of the 1990 Code.40 Within the subtle variations in
language, some general conclusions can be drawn. The obligation to
address at least the most egregious misconduct, by reporting to the
appropriate disciplinary body, makes clear that judges should not
confine their role to ad hoc treatment of misconduct issues that occur in
proceedings before them. On the other hand, this duty to report does
not necessarily convert judges into gatekeepers or police monitors
charged with minding the conduct of attorneys or the legal profession.42
Misconduct, 1 FLA. COASTAL L. J. 265, 292 n.10 (1999). See generally Arthur F. Greenbaum, The
Attorney's Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Roadmap for Reform, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 259 (2003); Gerard E. Lynch, The Lawyer As Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J. 491 (1986);
Douglas R. Richmond, Associates as Snitches and Rats, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1819 (1997); Ronald D.
Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's Unethical Violations in the Wake of
Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 977 (1988); Nikki A. Ott & Heather F. Newton, Comment, A Current
Look at Model Rule 8.3: How ls It Used and What Are Courts Doing About It?, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 747 (2003). Cf.Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Ending Illegitimate Advocacy: ReinvigoratingRule
11 Through Enhancement of the Ethical Duty to Report, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1555 (2001). Mandatory
reporting by judges has received fewer critiques. Prof. Leslie Abramson expresses concern that the
judge's duty to report judges and other lawyers serves as a threat to judicial independence. See
Abramson, supra note 14, at 752.
39. It is generally assumed that the obligation under the Rules of Professional Conduct to
report attorney misconduct applies equally to both lawyers and judges. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. (2003); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Pmbl. and
Preliminary Statement (1980) (indicating that the Disciplinary Rules apply to lawyers regardless of
professional capacity); ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED MODEL

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 581 (4th ed. 1999) (explaining that judges as lawyers are bound
by both Rule 8.3 of Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Canon 3(D)(2) of Judicial Code of
Conduct to report lawyer misconduct); Richard Klein, Legal Malpractice,ProfessionalDiscipline,
and Representationof the Indigent Defendant, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1171, 1190 (1988).
40. See Abramson, supranote 14, at 760-62.
41. Cf ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING
LAWYER SANCTIONS 5 (1986) (quoted in Abramson, supra note 14, at 754) (the ABA Committee
has criticized judges for taking the position that "there is no such need [to initiate the disciplinary
process] and that errant behavior of lawyers can be remedied solely by use of contempt proceedings
and other alternative means."). Cf.Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Rubin, 510 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ohio
1987) (referring to Canon 3B(3), the court stated that "we hasten to approve and encourage courts
throughout this state in their efforts to halt unprofessional conduct and meet their responsibilities in
reporting violations of the Code").
42. See, e.g., Fravel v. Haughey, 727 So. 2d 1033, 1036-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(rejecting reversal ofjudgment below based on violation of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar by
the prevailing party because "a direct independent undertaking of this policing role would go well
beyond the requirements of Canon 3(D)2 [sic] of the Code of Judicial Conduct ...and create a
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The obligation to report has been grounded in a variety of policy
justifications, including an obligation to the system of justice as a
whole, 43 and as a means to avoid misconduct, misuse or neglect of
duty. 44 The ethical obligation of the judiciary to report violations of the
attorney professional conduct rules that raise a substantial question as to
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects clearly links the judge as a feeder of information to the bar
disciplinary apparatus.45
There is ample reason to think that judges do not embrace this
reporting role as a central part of the judicial duties, but rather as a
subsidiary function. Judges are not a significant source of reporting
misconduct to the bar disciplinary apparatus.46 Courts occasionally
reveal the challenges of reporting misconduct. As with lawyers, the
human connection makes it "difficult" for trial judges to report "lawyers
with whom they have to work on a day to day basis. 47 There is a lurking
sense that futility plays a role for some judges. A judge on the Florida
Court of Appeals recently expressed his frustration with amazing
candor:
While in light of [the-lawyer's] egregious conduct, we feel duty bound
by Canon 3D(2), Code of Judicial Conduct hereby to report him to the
Florida Bar, we have no illusions that this will have any practical
effect. Our skepticism is caused by the fact that, of the many occasions
in which members of this court reluctantly and usually only after
agonizing over what we thought was the seriousness of doing sohave found it appropriate to make such a referral about a lawyer's
conduct in litigation ... none has resulted in the public imposition of
any discipline-not even a reprimand-whatever .... Speaking for
himself alone, the present writer has grown tired of felling trees in the
demand for significant increases in judicial resources."); In re J.B.K., 931 S.W.2d 581, 584-85 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1996) ("[w]e hasten to add that we are not merely the gatekeepers who monitor and patrol
the conduct of members of the Bar.").
43. See, e.g., In re J.B.K., 931 S.W.2d at 584 (noting that Canon 3D required reporting an
impermissible ex parte contact; the court also used inherent power to order the attorney to appear

before the court).
44. See In re Voorhees, 739 S.W.2d at 186.
45. See Abramson, supra note 14, at 780 ("[T]he responsibility to communicate
unprofessional behavior becomes all the more compelling when one considers that judges comprise
the one group that is most likely to observe or receive information regarding others' misconduct.").
46. See Levy, supranote 2, at 105-06.
47. State v. Wade, 839 A.2d 559, 565 (Vt. 2003) (Johnson, J., concurring) (overturning the
trial court's motion to dismiss a criminal case as sanction for the State's pattern of neglect and
misconduct in discovery matters; conviction reinstated because of lack of prejudice; matter referred
to bar).
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empty ethical forest which seems so much a part of the professional
landscape in this area. Perhaps the time has come to apply instead the
rule of conservation of judicial resources which
teaches that a court
48
should not require a useless act, even of itself.

It is difficult to discern from reported decisions how judges reach
the decision to report a lawyer to the bar. The seriousness of the
violation is obviously an important factor.49 Where the judge identifies
the attorney as a repeat actor, a single act in the current litigation may
reflect a pattern justifying a report to the appropriate disciplinary
authority.50 Judges react most sharply to circumstances in which the
lawyer's failure made the underlying proceeding inefficient or unfair, or
where court-based sanctions will not stop the conduct. For example,
courts have reported attorneys to the bar or the federal court's relevant
committee for engaging in ex parte contact, 51 failing to disclose a
material fact of the settlement to the court,52 making statements to the
48. Johnnides v. Amoco Oil Co., 778 So. 2d 443, 445 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (citing
over ten cases in which referrals had been made). There was more to the judge's frustration:
In fact, the reported decisions do not reflect that the Bar has responded concretely at all
to the tide of uncivil and unprofessional conduct which has been the subject of so much
article-writing, sermon-giving, seminar-holding and general hand-wringing for at least
the past twenty years.... Perhaps the ultimate example of the Bar's attitude toward the
problem is the case of Harvey Hyman, who was the subject of three separate complaints
by this court to the Bar... but who avoided any sanction by entering a diversion
program which consisted entirely of the arduous requirement of attending a day-long
seminar on trial ethics.
Id.
49. Prof. Abramson identifies three factors in the judicial determination of what action is
appropriate: "(1) the judge's level of certainty that a violation has occurred; (2) the risk of
unfairness in the trial if a judge does not take immediate action; and (3) whether the judge is sitting
in a state or federal court." Abramson, supra note 14, at 775.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, Ill F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1096-97 (E.D. Wis. 2000)
(holding that because the prosecutor's conduct was "not egregious, highly improper, or
unconscionable," a sanction pursuant to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3B(3) was not
appropriate); United States v. Hemandez-Ocampo, No. 92-101711, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 2696, at
* 11-13 (9th Cir. Feb. 2, 1993) (reporting misconduct of an attorney who, in an earlier case, rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel for conceding that there was no reasonable doubt as to the factual
issues in dispute, and, in the present case, conceded his client's technical guilt). Cf In re Eicher, 661
N.W.2d 354, 370 (S.D. 2003) (holding that the failure ofjudges in individual cases to report charges
of attorney misconduct to the bar did not indicate that charges lacked merit, particularly where each
judge "only had one incident before them" and the present court had "the benefit of an extensive
record with multiple complaints ... showing similar inappropriate conduct.").
51. See In re J.B.K., 931 S.W.2d at 584.
52. See AIG Haw. Ins. Co. v. Bateman, 923 P.2d 395, 401-02 (Haw. 1996) ("By bringing and
defending an appeal on a case that was actually moot, it appears that counsel for AIG and Vicente
may have violated HRCP Rule 3.1 by 'wasting the time and limited resources of this court [and]
having denied availability of the court's resources to deserving litigants[.]"'); Gum v. Dudley, 505
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press, 53 misconduct that sabotaged the trial, 54 lying under oath, 5'
inappropriate contact with class members, 56 and neglect.5 7 Federal courts
have the ability to refer serious misconduct to their own disciplinary
apparatus or to the state body.58 Federal courts are more likely to refer to
the state body when the misconduct did not happen in front of the
federal court.59
Courts will sometimes hasten to add that they are not making
findings of fact when reporting a colorable claim of serious
misconduct.6 ° State supreme courts might be inclined to avoid factual
determinations because they may find the same issue returning
to the
61
court in its capacity as head of the bar disciplinary apparatus.
Criminal cases provide particularly interesting issues in addressing
attorney misconduct because a case-based remedy may not stop the
conduct. A full development of the complex issues of regulating attorney
conduct in criminal cases is beyond the scope of this article. 62 It is
S.E.2d 391, 405 (W. Va. 1997) (although defense counsel's failure to disclose to the plaintiff that a
settlement agreement had been reached between two co-defendants did not justify new trial, the
matter was reported to Office of Disciplinary Counsel).
53. See Tozzolina v. County of Orange, No. 91-56370, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 17572, at *6-8
(9th Cir. Jul. 8, 1993).
54. See Quinones v. State, 766 So. 2d 1165, 1172 n.8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); United States
ex rel. Crist v. Lane, 577 F. Supp. 504, 510, 512 n.16 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (sending its opinion to Illinois
Supreme Court Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission where prosecutor's outrageous
and inflammatory conduct denied petitioner a fair trial).
55. See Leo's Gulf Liquors v. Lakhani, 802 So. 2d 337, 343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
56. See Cobell v. Norton, 212 F.R.D. 14,23-24 (D.D.C. 2002).
57. See Covington v. Smith, 582 S.E.2d 756, 771-72 (W. Va. 2003).
58. See Jeffrey A. Pamess, Disciplinary Referrals Under New Federal Civil Rule 11, 61
TENN. L. REV. 37, 59 (1993).
59. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Crist v. Lane, 577 F. Supp. 504, 512 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
("Were this the record of a federal criminal trial in this Court (fortunately a non-existent possibility,
given the quality of our United States Attorney's office), the case would clearly call for reference to
our own lawyer disciplinary system. In light of this Court's duty under Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 3B(3) and Code DR 1-103(A), and given the cumulative impact of the same prosecutor's
conduct in Shepard, a copy of this opinion is being sent to the Illinois Supreme Court Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission.").
60. See In re J.B.K., 931 S.W.2d 581, 584-85 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
61. Interview with former head of State Supreme Court, (June 16, 2003) (notes on file with J.
McMorrow).
62. This subject is well-developed in the literature. See, e.g., R. Michael Cassidy, Toward a
More Independent Grand Jury: Recasting and Enforcing the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose
ExculpatoryEvidence, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 361, 361 (2000); Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of
Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be
Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460, 497-99 (1996); Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal
Prosecutors:Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
69, 77-91 (1995); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating FederalProsecutors'Ethics,55
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sufficient for our purposes to note that courts occasionally find that

while the defense counsel or prosecutor's conduct does not violate
constitutional requirements, it merits reporting to the appropriate
disciplinary authority.63 More often than not, however, the reported
decisions analyzing whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel
are silent on whether serious misconduct
or prosecutorial misconduct
64
bar.
the
to
reported
was
While sending a copy of the court's opinion to the bar disciplinary
apparatus appears to be the most common method of public referral,
there is no logical or structural reason why referrals to the appropriate
disciplinary body must occur in a reported decision. Referrals might be
taking place far more often than the reported decisions indicate. This
suggests, once again, that the reported decisions provide only a partial
understanding of the interaction between judges and the formal bar
apparatus.65
While cases that cite the Code of Judicial Conduct offer us some
insights, the absence of significant reference to the Code of Judicial

VAND. L. REv. 381, 384-85 (2002); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of
FederalProsecutors,88 GEO. L.J. 207, 225-43 (2000).
63. For reporting of defense counsel, see, e.g., United States v. Hemandez-Ocampo, CA. No.
92-1017, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 2696, at *13 (9th Cir. Feb. 2, 1993); United States v. Swanson,
943 F.2d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 1991) (reversing conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel and
referring a copy the of opinion to State Bar of Arizona). For reporting of prosecutors, see, e.g.,
Tozzolina v. County of Orange, No. 91-56370, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 17572, at *7-8 (9th Cir. July
8, 1993); United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 1984) (affirming conviction but
referring prosecutor for disciplinary action); Suarez v. State, 481 So. 2d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 1985)
(stating that disciplinary sanction rather than suppression of defendant's statement was the
appropriate remedy for prosecutor's unethical conduct); State v. Hohman, 420 A.2d 852, 855 (Vt.
1980) (affirming conviction but referring to bar).
To bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the Board of Immigration
Appeals, the applicant must explain whether a report of the ethical or legal violation has been made
with the appropriate authorities. See In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 637 (BIA 1988); see also
Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the INS reporting obligation
was not sacrosanct, particularly where misconduct is egregious).
64. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (ineffective assistance of
counsel; no reference to reporting wrongdoing to bar); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (knowing
use of false testimony by prosecutor; no reference to reporting wrongdoing to bar).
65. At least one state supreme court has interpreted the confidentiality requirements of
disciplinary matters as a reason to limit public referrals in opinions only for matters that involve
direct misconduct that is the subject of the court's opinion. See, e.g., State v. Wade, 839 A.2d 559,
562 (Vt. 2003) ("While any justice or judge can, of course, refer a complaint against a lawyer to the
Professional Responsibility Board, we regret that the concurrence has ignored the requirements of
confidentiality set forth in our Administrative Order No. 9, Rule 12, and has done so in the public
forum of a Supreme Court decision."). The concurrence argued that confidentiality was meant to
apply only to disciplinary actions after the complaint was filed. Id. at 565.
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Conduct is perhaps more compelling. As addressed in detail below,
judges address attorney conduct issues on a daily basis. Even in the face
of egregious conduct, judges often do not see the need to cite the Code
of Judicial Conduct to justify the decision to sanction the attorney or
report to the relevant bar disciplinary body. We can infer that a visceral
understanding of the judge's role and the importance of controlling the
proceeding before the judge provides ample independent justification for
responding to attorney misconduct. The Code of Judicial Conduct
simply does not give us sufficient understanding of what motivates a
judge to respond to ethical issues that arise in the courtroom. The next
step is to explore what judges do in their courtrooms.
III.

FEDERAL COURTS' ATTITUDES TOWARD ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT

A.

Overview ofJudicialAttitudes Reflected in FederalCourt Opinions

Through written opinions judges reveal both their vision of the
judiciary's role in regulating attorney conduct and their vision of
appropriate attorney conduct.66 Admittedly there are limitations to
attempting to glean from the pages of the Federal Reporter the attitudes
and views of the judiciary. Written opinions provide only a onedimensional view of the federal courts' attitude towards attorney
misconduct. Despite these limitations, a review of both federal district
and appellate decisions reveals that judges do not perceive their role in
regulating attorney conduct as an ethical mandate; nor do they appear to
consider it a necessary component of their judicial duties.6 7
A survey of the federal case law shows that judges take a fairly
practical and holistic approach to addressing attorney conduct. Federal
courts are focused primarily on attorney conduct that affects the
66. The distinction between written opinions and published opinions is less significant with
the increased access to electronic reporting. Because our goal is to discern judicial attitudes, we
have treated written opinions designated as not for citation the same as traditionally published
opinions. See generally Lawrence J. Fox, Those UnpublishedOpinions: An AppropriateExpedience
or an Abdication of Responsibility?, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1215 (2004).
67. Because our focus is on discerning judicial attitudes toward regulating attorney conduct in
litigation, we have not delved into the related issue of what rules of professional conduct apply in
federal court practice. For a fuller background on this subject, see 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2000) (known
as the McDade Amendment, this section directs federal courts to apply state ethics rules to
prosecutors in federal court); MCMORROW & COQUILLETrE, supra note 8, at § 807; Bruce A.
Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How
Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 460, 521-23 (1996); Fred C. Zacharias,
FederalizingLegal Ethics, 73 TEx. L. REv. 335, 340 (1994).
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litigation process and the integrity of the judicial system. Federal judges
do not perceive themselves as responsible for regulatory oversight of the
legal profession. 68 A court's choice of sanctions appears to track this
broad focus. The type and severity of the sanction often corresponds
with the judge's perception of whether and how much the attorney's
behavior affected the integrity of the judicial system. One theme that
runs consistently through the opinions is that judges believe and
communicate, either implicitly or explicitly, that an attorney's primary
responsibility is to the proper functioning of the system. The cases
suggest that the concept of "officer of the court" is alive and well in
federal court practice.69
''coc

B. The Power to Regulate
It is axiomatic that a federal court has the ability to supervise the
conduct of attorneys who appear before it.70 Early in the federal court's
evolution, the Supreme Court recognized that "[c]ourts of justice are
universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with
power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and
submission to their lawful mandates.", 7' The Court later acknowledged
that these powers included a court's ability to discipline attorneys who
appear before it. 72 A court's ability to discipline attorneys derives not
just from its inherent powers,7 3 but also from various statutory

68. Professors Fred C. Zacharias and Bruce A. Green offer a rich analysis of the federal court
authority to regulate lawyers, giving an apt subtitle of "A Practice in Search of a Theory." See
generally Zacharias & Green, supra note 2. How judges act-the practice-appears to be as much
or more the product of the judge's vision of his or her judicial role than a measured analysis of the
judge's power to sanction attorneys.
69. See generally Butler v. Biocore Med. Techs., Inc., 348 F.3d 1163, 1173 (10th Cir. 2003)
("This is justified because attorney misconduct both implicates the attorney's fitness to function as
an officer of the court and triggers the court's responsibility to protect the public from unscrupulous
or unqualified practitioners."); In re Finkelstein, 901 F.2d 1560, 1564 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Because
lawyers are officers of the court which granted admission, such courts are necessarily vested with
the authority, within certain limits, to impose reasonable sanctions for lawyer misconduct."); Canon
v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 676 F. Supp. 823, 830 (N.D. 111.1987) ("Attorneys are officers of the
court, and their first duty is to the administration ofjustice.").
70. See generally MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supranote 8, at § 807. See also Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,43 (1991).
71. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 227 (1821).
72. See Ex ParteBurr, 22 U.S. 529,531 (1824).
73. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43. For a thorough discussion of the various sources of power
to regulate attorney conduct in federal court practice, see generally Zacharias & Green, supra note
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provisions,74 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,7 5 and the district
courts' local rules.76 Some commentators have even suggested that
federal courts might have broad, independent, authority to regulate
attorneys. 77
While there is no doubt that federal courts have the power to
discipline attorney misconduct, it is less clear whether, when, or how a
court will use its power. District courts have described the ability to
supervise attorney conduct as a "duty" or a "fundamental
responsibility. '78 One district court, relying on Ex Parte Burr, concluded
that "[c]ourts are required mandatorily to exercise this duty to preserve
judicial decorum and to enforce the respectability of the legal
profession., 79 While the courts use mandatory language when they
describe their power to act, it is readily apparent that courts perceive
their ability to sanction attorney misconduct as a discretionary tool rather
than an obligatory role.
Courts have expressed differing views on what role a federal court
plays in regulating attorney conduct. The Second and Fifth Circuits'
decisions defining the role of the federal judiciary in regulating attorney
conduct illustrate the contrasting philosophies. The Second Circuit has
taken the position that "[t]he business of the court is to dispose of
litigation and not to act as a general overseer of the ethics of those who
practice here unless the questioned behavior taints the trial of the cause
before it."' 80 Under the Second Circuit's reasoning, ethical issues that
surface during the course of litigation are better addressed by the
74. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2004).
75. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11; FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b); FED. R. APP. P. 46. Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is an example of a procedural rule that incorporates an ethical
mandate and gives it force. See generally Judith A. McMorrow, Rule 11 and FederalizingLawyer
Ethics, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 959 (1991).
76. See, e.g., M.D. ALA. U.S.D.C. LOCAL R. 83.1; D. ARK. U.S.D.C. LOCAL R. 4; D.D.C.
U.S.D.C. LOCAL R. 16.2.
77. See generally Zacharias & Green, supra note 2.
78. Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 862 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (quoting Universal Athletic
Sales Co. v. Am. Gym, Recreational & Athletic Equip. Corp., 357 F. Supp. 905, 908 (W.D. Pa.
1973); see also Blue Cross and Blue Shield of N.J. v. Phillip, 53 F. Supp. 2d 338, 344-45 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (commenting that it is the responsibility of the court to ensure that the standards of ethics
remain high); Terrebone, Ltd. of Cal. v. Murray, I F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054 (E.D. Cal. 1998)
79. United States v. Anonymous, 215 F. Supp. 111,
113 (E.D. Tenn. 1963); see also, Black,
492 F. Supp. at 859 (noting that "[a] fundamental responsibility of any trial court is the supervision
of attorneys who appear and practice before it."); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371,
382 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (recognizing courts have a duty "to supervise the conduct of the attorneys
appearing before it and from its obligation to see that it and the legal system do not fall into
disrepute").
80. W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1976).
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"comprehensive disciplinary machinery of the state and federal bar,...
or possibly by legislation.",81 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has "squarely
rejected this hands-off approach," instead holding that district courts are
"obliged to take measures against unethical conduct occurring in
connection with any proceeding before it."'82 According to the Fifth
Circuit "it is not clear that the vitality of state enforcement is relevant to
the judicial duty of the federal courts to clean its own house. 83
As these two approaches aptly illustrate, the appellate decisions
suggest that there is significant uncertainty about a federal judge's role
in regulating attorney misconduct. The philosophical differences,
however, are not as sharp in practice. District courts, even those within
the two circuits, appear to have adopted a hybrid approach-focusing
their attention on conduct that sullies the underlying litigation and
judicial system but relying primarily on their own power to sanction
attorney misconduct rather than the available state enforcement
mechanisms. 84 Courts are concerned primarily with whether an
attorney's behavior taints the judicial process and by implication the
system as a whole. 85 Preservation of popular faith with the judicial
system is the court's foremost consideration.8 6 As the Fourth Circuit
observed, "As soon as the process falters.., the people are then justified
in abandoning support for the system in favor of one where honesty is
preeminent., 87 As a result, courts are willing to act sua sponte,
identifying attorney behavior that may have an adverse affect on the
proceedings.88 The power to regulate emanates not from ethical
81. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 446 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist,
590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979)).
82. In re Am. Airlines, 972 F.2d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Woods v. Covington
County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1992)).
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Group Equip. Fin., Inc., 138 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1998)
(noting that a district court judge may deal directly with an ethical violation or refer it to the
committee on grievance, or both); MacDraw v. Inc. v. CIT Group Equip. Fin., Inc., 73 F.3d 1253,
1262 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that "a district court need not hesitate to impose penalties for
unreasonable conduct and acts of bad faith."); NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc.
124 F.R.D. 120, 146 (W.D. La. 1989) (using inherent powers to sanction an attorney and sending a
copy of the opinion to the Board of Bar Overseers in Massachusetts and Louisiana).
85. See Giardina v. Ruth U. Fertal, Inc., 110 Civ. A. 00-1674, 2001 WL 1628597, at *3 (E.D.
La. Dec. 17, 2001); United States v. Schaffer Equip. Co., II F.3d 450, 458-59 (4th Cir. 1993);
Telectronics Propriety, Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc. 836 F.2d 1332, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988); IBM Corp. v.
Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Scozzafava, 833 F. Supp. 203, 210
(W.D.N.Y. 1993); Koch v. Koch, Indus., 798 F. Supp. 1525, 1530 n.2 (D. Kan. 1992).
87. Schaffer Equip. Co., I IF.3d at 457.
88. See, e.g., Norsyn, Inc. v. Desai, 351 F.3d 825, 831 (8th Cir. 2003); Tapers v. Local 530 of
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mandates but from the general duty to preserve the integrity of the
system.89
Despite the Second Circuit's suggestion, federal courts relatively
rarely rely on the state disciplinary system to regulate attorney
misconduct in their courts. 90 A court is more likely to refer an attorney to
an internal disciplinary committee for investigation and oversight. 9 1 A
federal judge's decision to refer to the federal court's disciplinary
committee rather than to the state's disciplinary committee may reflect
the view expressed by the Fifth Circuit that federal courts are
responsible for cleaning their own house.9 2 In addition, both federal
district courts and federal appellate courts have their own admission
requirements, informal and formal rules of conduct, and an inherent
power to sanction. Moreover, a referral to a disciplinary committee,
whether internal or at the state level, is just one of many tools available
to a federal judge. Indeed, a review of the written opinions reveals that
federal courts rely less on referral and more on the variety93 of creative
sanctions they have devised to address attorney misconduct.
But in the end, whether a court confronts attorney misconduct and
how it responds to the behavior is largely left to the individual court's

Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons, No. 93-CV-154 (JG), 1996 WL 1088933, at *4 (E.D.N.Y
Oct. 24, 1996); In re Chou-Chen Chemicals, Inc., 31 B.R. 842, 851 n.35 (Bankr. W.D. Ky 1983)
("The court should sua sponte raise ethical problems involving danger to a just, speedy, and
inexpensive remedy."). See also FED. R. CIv. P. 1l(c)(l)(B) (authorizing the court to act sua sponte
in imposing sanctions when it finds attorney misconduct).
89. See Gadda v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 861, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2004); Schaffer Equip. Co., II
F.3d at 458 (citing Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944));
United States ex rel. Sheldon Elec. Co. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 423 F. Supp. 486,
489 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
90. Courts appear to rely on a state disciplinary mechanism when (1) they do not have the
ability to refer to a court's disciplinary committee because the attorney is not a member of the bar;
or (2) the behavior is perceived as exceptionally egregious. Federal courts are more likely to refer to
a state disciplinary apparatus where the conduct under review occurred in state court. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Crist v. Lane, 577 F. Supp. 504, 512 n.16 (N.D. I11. 1983) ("Were this the
record of a federal criminal trial in this Court (fortunately a non-existent possibility, given the
quality of our United States Attorney's office), the case would clearly call for reference to our own
lawyer disciplinary system. In light of this Court's duty under the Code of Judicial Conduct Canon
3B(3) and Code DR 1-103(A), and given the cumulative impact of the same prosecutor's conduct in
Shepard, a copy of this opinion is being sent to the Illinois Supreme Court Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission.").
91. See, e.g., Ausherman v. Bank of Am. Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 435, 441 (D. Md. 2002);
Higginbotham v. KCS Intern., Inc., 202 F.R.D. 444, 460 (D. Md. 2001).
92. See, e.g., Ausherman, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 441 (stating that the Court is required to "refer
this matter to this Court's disciplinary committee.").
93. See infra Part III.E.
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discretion.94 Thus, while the power to regulate is beyond peradventure, it
is not at all clear what will be regulated. An attorney is not insulated
from sanctions simply because he or she follows the rules of
professional conduct. While courts certainly employ the ethical rules
established by the profession as benchmarks, the rules do not establish
an exclusive list of sanctionable conduct nor do they provide insight on
appropriate sanctions. While an attorney's ethical violation certainly
impugns the integrity of the system, other conduct can be seen as
undermining the judicial process and system without being labeled
unethical.
C. What Conduct DistrictCourts Are Regulating
At the forefront of judicial opinions addressing attorney misconduct
is the court's concern with conduct that undermines the integrity of the
96
judicial system, 95 the public's confidence in its proper functioning,
and-coming in a more distant third-the integrity of the bar. 97 As a
result, courts will sanction attorneys for, among other things, making
misleading statements to the court 98 or opposing attorneys, 99 refusing or
repeatedly failing to follow court orders,100 including scheduling

94. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990) (recognizing that
appellate courts should apply a deferential standard of review to district court decisions to sanction);
Gadda,363 F.3d at 873; Ausherman, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 444.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Taleo, 222 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000); Douglas v.
DynMcDermott Petro. Op. Co., 144 F.3d 364, 370 (5th Cir. 1998); Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 239 F.
Supp. 2d 1022, 1031 (D. Mont. 2003); Tec Air, Inc. v. Nippondenso Mfg. USA, Inc., No. 91C 4488,
1999 WL 965418, at *2 (N.D. 111.Sept. 30, 1999); Kirschner v. Zoning Bd. Of Appeals, 159 F.R.D.
391, 399 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
96. See Black v. Mo., 492 F. Supp. 848, 873 (W.D. Mo. 1980). See also Erickson v. Newmar
Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 303 (9th Cir. 1996); Ayus v. TotalRenal Care, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 714, 718
(S.D. Tex. 1999); Pendleton v. Cent. N.M. Corr. Facility, 184 F.R.D. 637, 641 (D.N.M. 1999)
(implying that the misconduct in question contributes to the public's perception of the way the
judicial system functions).
97. See, e.g., In re Morrissey, 305 F.3d 211, 225 (4th Cir. 2002); Douglas, 144 F.3d at 370;
Mattice v. Meyer, 353 F.2d 316, 319 (8th Cir. 1965); In re Haley, 60 F. Supp. 2d 926, 927 (E.D.
Ark. 1999).
98. SeeLasar, 239 F. Supp. at 1033.
99. See Ausherman v. Bank of Am. Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 435, 446 (D. Md. 2002); Brown v.
County of Genesee, 694 F. Supp. 250, 251-52 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse
and Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507, 512 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
100. See Hawkins v. AT&T Corp., No. SA-02-CA-0166-RF, 2003 WL 22736525, at *2 (W.D.
Tex. Nov. 12, 2003); Grine v. Coombs, 214 F.R.D. 312, 369 (W.D. Pa. 2003).
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orders, 10 ' and exhibiting a lack of civility. 10 2 Almost without exception,
courts emphasize a 10lawyer's
duty to the judicial system as a whole when
3
imposing sanctions.
Courts will sanction conduct that occurs at any point in the
litigation process-both inside and outside of the courtroom. 104 The
court's focus is not where the conduct occurred but how the behavior is
affecting the judicial process and the fair administration of justice.'0 5
Outside the courtroom, discovery disputes and misleading settlement
negotiations often raise the ire of the courts. Courts appear to address
attorney misconduct most frequently during the course of discovery
when attorneys are vying for tactical advantage. 0 6 Courts are most likely
to sanction discovery disputes after they have consumed an inordinate
amount of court resources and have required repeated court
interventions. 10 7 In addition, courts have little tolerance for behavior
101. See Bagby v. Attorney General of N.Y., No. 02 Civ. 4663 (JSRDF), 2004 WL 324896, at
*2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2004); Santos Sanchez v. Hosp. Menonita de Cayey, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 12,
14-15 (D.P.R. 2003).
102. See Mruz v. Caring, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64-65 (D.N.J. 2001); In re First City
Bankcorp. of Tex., Inc., 270 B.R. 807, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2001); Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 84 F. Supp.
2d 629, 639 (D.V.I. 1999).
103. See United States v. Schaffer Equip. Co., II F.3d 450, 458 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The general
duty of candor and truth thus takes its shape from the larger object of preserving the integrity of the
judicial system."); In re Grievance Comm. of United States Dist. Ct., 847 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir.
1988)(observing that "most code provisions [] obligate an attorney to take affirmative measures to
preserve the integrity of the judicial system"); Schmude ex rel. Schmude v. Sheahan, No. 00 C4580,
2004 WL 1045798, at *22 (N.D. I11.May 4, 2004) ("Lawyers therefore are responsible ... for
maintaining public confidence in the system of justice by acting competently ... "); Shade v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 72 F. Supp. 2d 518, 524 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (noting the duty of candor
"takes it shape from the larger object of preserving the integrity of the judicial system").
104. See In re Morrissey, 305 F.3d 211,216 (4th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court decision to
disbar attorney for conduct that occurred while his license to practice was suspended); Ausherman,
212 F. Supp. 2d at 443; Higginbotham v. KCS Int'l, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 444, 445 (D. Md. 2001).
105. Courts are even willing to sanction attorney conduct that effects the integrity of the
litigation when an attorney never makes an appearance in the case. In Pumphrey v. K.W. Thompson
Tool Company, 62 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit set aside a jury verdict because of
the conduct of an in-house corporate counsel who participated in the trial but never made an
appearance, was not admitted pro hac vice, and did not file any documents as an officer of the court.
Id. at 1131-32.
106. See Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 210-11 (1999) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("Delays and abuses in discovery are the source of widespread injustice .... Trial
courts must have the capacity to ensure prompt compliance with their orders, especially when
attorneys attempt to abuse the discovery process to gain a tactical advantage.") The Supreme Court
recently held that allowing an immediate appeal of Rule 37 sanctions would undermine the purpose
of the rule which was "designed to protect courts and opposing parties from delaying or harassing
tactics during the discovery process." Id. at 208.
107. See Abou-Sakher v. McCoy, No. 98-6704, 2000 WL 1562839, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 11,
2000); Kearns v. Wood Motors, Inc., No. 96-1314, 1997 WL 18817, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 17, 1997);
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during discovery that is aggressive rather than adversarial. 0 8 But
discovery disputes are not the only target of court review. An attorney's
conduct in settlement negotiations will also be scrutinized.' 0 9
Specifically, courts will admonish and sanction attorneys for their lack
of candor during settlement talks.1 0 As one court aptly noted "[i]t is just
as damaging to the integrity of our adversary system for an attorney
knowingly to make a false statement of material fact to an opposing
counsel during settlement negotiations, as it is to lie to a lawyer or the
judge in court. '
A recurring theme throughout the opinions is the federal court's
concern for the proper allocation of judicial resources. Federal courts
readily sanction conduct that is perceived as wasting judicial
resources. 112 Courts cite to two primary reasons for these sanctions.
First, often an attorney's failure to comply with defined time
constraints-especially if compliance must be compelled by the courtis perceived as undermining the integrity of the system.' 13 The
connection between the waste of judicial resources and the integrity of
the system is most readily revealed in a court's response to discovery
delays." 4 Courts perceive an attorney's dilatory tactics in discovery as
an attempt to obfuscate the truth-the very thing the judicial system is

Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1539-42 (11th Cir. 1993) (describing the district
court's repeated interventions and orders to compel discovery before imposing sanctions).
108. See Parker v. Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1006. 1013 (N.D. Ill.
2003) ("As we have emphasized before, the boundaries of ethical responsibilities must not be
trampled by aggressive lawyering. This Court cannot condone discovery abuses and violations of
our Rules of Professional Responsibility and Local Rules by turning a blind eye to practices that
undermine the cases before us and the judicial system as a whole."); Higginbotham, 202 F.R.D. at
446 (sanctioning attorneys for conduct during depositions that was uncivil, "purely retaliatory,
entirely knowing and purposeful and thus utterly out-of-bounds"); Saldana v. K-MART Corp., 84 F.
Supp. 2d 629, 638 (D.V.I. 1999) (sanctioning attorney for her abrasive conduct toward opposing
counsel including the use of profanity during telephone calls).
109. See Ausherman, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 443-44.
110. See id.; see also Pendleton v. Central N.M. Corr. Facility, 184 F.R.D. 637, 641 (D.N.M.
1999).
111. Ausherman, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 444.
112. See Durham v. Lewis, No. 98-1761, 1998 WL 846890, at *3 (7th Cir. Nov. 17, 1998);
Williams v. State, No. C 00-1461-EDL, 2003 WL 151533, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2003); Fla.
Software Sys., Inc. v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1337-38 (M.D. Fla.
2000); Beers v. GM Corp., No. 97-CV-482 (NPM/DNH), 1999 WL 325378, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. May
17, 1999).
113. See Saudi v. Valmet-Appleton, 219 F.R.D. 128, 134 (E.D. Wis. 2003); Brown v. Iowa,
152 F.R.D. 168, 177 (S.D. Ia. 1993).
114. See Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 987 F.2d 1536, 1546 (11th Cir. 1993).
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meant to promote.' 1 5 Second, the efficiency of the system is seen as
inextricably linked to the public's confidence in it. More than one court
has noted that the delays and adversarial foot-dragging is "exactly the
type of conduct that the public finds abhorrent and that
contributes to the
'1 16
low esteem that the bar is currently trying to reverse."
The court's role as guardian of judicial resources creates a
significant question about the court's optimal role in regulating attorney
conduct. 17 There is significant tension between the costs in judicial
resources related to overseeing attorney conduct and the costs related to
taking a "hands off approach." A judge's decision about the level of his
or her involvement in discovery disputes illustrates the tension inherent
in trying to define the parameters of the court's role as overseer. On the
one hand, a judge may take a more active approach and encourage
attorneys to seek the court's guidance if they reach an impasse in
discovery. While this approach may result in a more expedited discovery
process, it also may result in the judge spending judicial resources
presiding over subsidiary and often unnecessary disputes. On the other
hand, a judge may take a "hands off approach," requiring attorneys to
grapple with discovery issues without court guidance. While this
approach leaves the judge free to attend to other court business, it raises
the possibility that significant resources will be spent as attorneys
struggle to resolve discovery issues without court intervention. The latter
approach contains an additional hidden cost for the judicial system. In
instances when the case involves parties with unequal financial
resources, the court's unwillingness to address attorney misconduct early
in the process may interfere with the proper functioning of the judicial

115. Seeid. at 1546-47.
116. Pendleton, 184 F.R.D. at 641; see also Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 792 (5th
Cir. 1990) ("Delays [in litigation] are a particularly abhorrent feature of today's trial practice. They
increase the cost of litigation, to the detriment of the parties enmeshed in it; they are one factor
causing disrespect for lawyers and the judicial process; and they fuel the increasing resort to means
of non-judicial dispute resolution. Adherence to reasonable deadlines is critical to restoring integrity
in court proceedings.").
117. See Hill v. Norfolk and W. Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1207 (7th Cir. 1987) (Parsons, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part) ("Strong judicial management is a potential threat to the
adversary system as it has existed for hundreds of years because it calls for a significant change in
the power relationship between judges and lawyers and in their respective functions. Indeed, there
are risks in imposing a meaningful duty on attorneys to act in the interests of the judicial system,
rather than exclusively in that of their clients, and in placing enforcement of that duty in the hands
of the judges, whose primary concern could well become efficiency rather than justice itself.").
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system. 1 18 District court judges must consider these hidden costs when
they consider their role in addressing attorney misconduct.
D. What Appellate Courts Are Regulating
Appellate courts have three distinct roles in regulating attorney
conduct. First, appellate courts review a district court's decision whether
to sanction and what sanction to impose. Second, appellate courts may
independently evaluate the district court record and impose sanctions.
Third, appellate courts recognize a separate and distinct duty to regulate
attorney misconduct that occurs at the appellate level."1 9
Regardless of their role, appellate courts, like district courts, are
primarily concerned with the integrity of the judicial system and the fair
and efficient administration of justice. Appellate courts, however, appear
to address attorney misconduct in a broader context. District court
judges primarily focus on how the attorney's conduct affected the
litigation before the court, with a secondary focus on how that conduct
affects the judicial system as a whole. In contrast, appellate courts are
more likely to view attorney misconduct through a broader systemic
lens-assessing the impact the attorney's behavior on the integrity of the
judicial system.
1. Appellate Courts' Review of District Court Sanctions
In theory, appellate courts review district courts' sanctions under an
abuse of discretion standard. 120 The standard is lenient because, as
appellate courts recognize, district courts are primarily responsible for
the supervision of the attorneys practicing before them.' 2' In practice,
however, appellate courts appear to adopt a two-tiered approach to
reviewing district court decisions. The first tier addresses the decision to

118. See generally Maurice Rosenberg, FederalRules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing
Their Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2197, 2204-05 (1989) (discussing costs of litigation and noting
that in survey of 1000 judges, "abusive discovery was rated highest among the reasons for the high
cost of litigation"); see also Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367-68 (11 th Cir.
1997) (noting that "discovery imposes burdens on the judicial system; scarce judicial resources must
be diverted from other cases to resolve discovery disputes").
119. See MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 8, at § 803.01 (discussing FED. R. APP. P.
46 as a tool for regulating attorney conduct before appellate courts).
120. See First Bank of Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 501, 510 (6th Cir.
2002). But see In re Am. Airlines, 972 F.2d 605, 609 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating "a district court's
ruling upon a motion to disqualify is not a matter of discretion.").
121. See Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1996); Gas-A-Tron of Ariz. v.
Union Oil Co. of Cal., 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1976).
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sanction and is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. The
second tier addresses the sanction imposed and a different, and perhaps
more stringent, standard of review is applied. 22 One court described its
second-tier
review as determining whether the sanction imposed was
'just.'' 123 While the majority of district court responses to attorney
misconduct are affirmed, appellate courts have reversed 5district court
124
decisions to sanction, and inrare cases, not to sanction. 1
The appellate courts' two-tiered approach to reviewing district
court decisions appears to reflect the different perspectives of the two
courts. Appellate courts recognize that the district court judge is in the
best position to decide whether a sanction is warranted. 26 District court
judges have observed the attorney's behavior and the impact of that
behavior on the litigation process. But the decision whether to sanction
is distinct from the decision how to sanction. As will be discussed more
fully in Part E of this section, the type of sanction imposed is often a
reflection of whether the attorney's misconduct challenged the proper
functioning of the underlying litigation or whether the misconduct
undermined the integrity of the system as a whole.
Because appellate courts view the type of sanction imposed through
a broader systemic lens, they are more likely to scrutinize the type of
sanction imposed to determine whether it accurately reflects the
egregiousness of the conduct. 127Appellate courts, removed from the fray
and intensity of the trial process, caution district courts to use restraint
when exercising their power to regulate attorney conduct and to
122. See Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1543 (11 th Cir. 1993).
123. Id.
124. See Gas-A-Tron, 536 F.2d at 1325 (reversing a district court decision to disqualify an
attorney); In re Coord. Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Litig., 658 F.2d 1355, 1362 (9th
Cir. 1981); Bd. of Educ. of N.Y. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1250 (2d Cir. 1979).
125. See Erickson, 87 F.3d at 303-304; Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 885
(5th Cir. 1988).
126. See Kelly v. Golden, 352 F.3d 344, 352 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that the district court is in
a better position to decide what sanctions are appropriate for the misconduct); Motorola Inc. v.
Interdigital Technology Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1468 (Fed Cir. 1997) ("The trial judge is better able
to assess the conduct of parties appearing before it than is this court. Questions of misconduct often
involve the tone and tenor of advocacy, rather than the literal words of the advocate. In such
instances, a cold printed record cannot fully convey the aspects of conduct that a trial court might
find egregious. Thus, this court is careful to avoid substituting its assessment of facts for those of
the judge who experienced them firsthand."); Estate of Solis-Rivera v. United States, 993 F.2d 1, 3
(1 st Cir.1993) ("A district court, which has direct and continuous contact with attorneys, is best able
to judge in the first instance whether an attorney's misconduct is sufficiently egregious to warrant
the 'death knell' of a lawsuit, or whether some lesser sanction would be more appropriate."); Blue v.
United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 538 (4th Cir. 1990).
127. See United States v. Schaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 1993).
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narrowly tailor the sanctions imposed. 28 The severity of the sanction
must match the perceived egregiousness of the conduct. 129 Although
rules and statutes outlining appropriate conduct and possible sanctions
are often written in broad language, a district court's discretion in
imposing a sanction is not unbridled. 130 So while a district court's
decision to sanction is reviewed with deference, the decision how to
sanction appears to receive more scrutiny.
2. Appellate Court's Response to Attorney Misconduct
Beyond the review of district court sanctions, appellate courts
acknowledge that they too have a responsibility to supervise attorney
conduct and, consistent with that recognition, take an active role in
regulating attorney conduct. 131 When addressing attorney conduct, the
appellate court uses the same systemic approach that influences their
review of district court decisions. The appellate courts evince a
willingness to sanction attorney conduct that occurs before the appellate
courts as well as behavior that occurred but was not caught or
recognized in the district courts. 132 Under this rubric, appellate courts are
not only addressing conduct that affects the appellate process but also
133
conduct that was perceived as affecting the litigation process below.
Like district courts, appellate courts are willing to raise sua sponte the
128. See id. (affirming the imposition of sanctions, but vacating the type); see also Webb v.
District of Columbia, 146 F.3d 964, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same); Doyle v. Murray, 938 F.2d 33, 35
(4th Cir. 1991) (same).
129. See Richardson v. Boddie-Noell Enter. Inc., No. 03-1011, 2003 WL 22429534, at *4 (4th
Cir. Oct. 27, 2003); see also In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 646-47 (1985) (reversing an appellate
court's suspension of an attorney for a harsh and ill-mannered letter criticizing the court's
administration).
130. See Richardson, 2003 WL 22429534, at *4 (comparing the broad language in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) allowing a court to dismiss a case for failure to comply with a rules of
procedure with conduct appropriate to necessitate dismissal); Berry v. Cigna/RSI-Cigna, 975 F.2d
1188, 1191 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that a district court must expressly determine that a lesser
sanction would not deter conduct or the record must show that the district court employed a lesser
sanction that proved to be futile).
131. See Fla. Breckenridge, Inc. v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., No. 98-4606, 1999 WL 292667, at *4
(11 th Cir. May 11, 1999); In re Beck, 902 F.2d 5, 7 (7th Cir. 1990) ("It is an important part of the
judicial office to ensure competence and dedication of the bar, as well as its adherence to ethical
standards."); see also FED. R. Civ. P 46(b) (allowing for discipline if an attorney is "guilty of
conduct unbecoming a member of the court's bar").
132. See, e.g., V.I. Hous. Auth. v. David, 823 F.2d 764, 767 (3d Cir. 1987) (sanctioning an
attorney when, on appeal, it was discovered he made misrepresentations to the district court).
133. See, e.g., Top Entm't, Inc. v. Ortega, 285 F.3d 115, 118 (1st Cir. 2002) (making an
independent assessment that the original complaint violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
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propriety of sanctions. 3 4 Consistent with their systemic approach, even
if a motion for sanctions is brought by the opposing attorney, appellate
courts will look135beyond the motion and investigate an attorney's history
of misconduct.
Like the district courts, appellate courts are extremely sensitive to
conduct that wastes judicial resources 1 36 and they have little tolerance
for attorneys who abuse the appellate process.' 37 It is commonly
recognized that a court should discipline attorneys who harass their
138
opponents and waste judicial resources by abusing the legal process.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 provides the basis for
"penalizing this waste of appellate resources ,,139 and it is frequently
cited to support sanctions imposed at the appellate level. The waste of
appellate resources encompasses a broad array of conduct from filing a
groundless appeal 40 to failing to properly cite to the record in an
appellate brief.141 Like the district courts, appellate courts link the
protection of judicial resources to both the integrity of the system and
the public's confidence in it. 142 Courts cite to the mounting federal case
loads and the growing public dissatisfaction with the costs and delays of
litigation as the basis for sanctions designed to discourage groundless
134. See Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 807-08 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
135. See In re Bagdade, 334 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("Bagdade's conduct
led the appellees to seek sanctions, which in turn led us to inquire whether he had been sanctioned
before.").
136. See Jenkins v. Tatem, 795 F.2d 112, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (commenting that due to the
"back log" of cases pending appellate review "the parties' paper vendetta in this court is particularly
inexcusable because of the heavy volume of legitimate business in this court.").
137. See Coghlan, 852 F.2d, at 809 (stating that a frivolous appeal is an unjustified
consumption of appellate resources); Bank of Canton, Ltd v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 636 F.2d 30, 31
(2d Cir. 1980) (commenting that the "appeal is so completely frivolous as to render its prosecution
an abuse of appellate process").
138. See Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 341 (2d Cir. 1999).
139. See Coghlan, 852 F.2d at 815; see, e.g., Duran v. N.M. Dep't of Labor, No. 01-2329,
2002 WL 1462861, at *3 (10th Cir. July 9, 2002); Carmon v. Lubrizol Corp., 177 F.3d 791, 793
(5th Cir. 1994); Bell v. City of Kellogg, 922 F.2d 1418, 1425 (9th Cir. 1991); Schiff v. United
States, No. 90-5025, 1990 WL 120619, at *2 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
140. See In re 60 E. 80th St. Equities, Inc., 218 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir. 2000); Wilton Corp. v.
Ashland Castings Corp., 188 F.3d 670, 676 (6th Cir. 1999).
141. See Day v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Corp., 164 F.3d 382, 384 (7th Cir. 1999) (commenting that
the purposes of the Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(6) was to provide pinpoint citations
so judges could readily find the facts).
142. See Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1368 (11th Cir. 1997) ("Allowing
a case to proceed through the pretrial processes with an invalid claim that increases the costs of the
case does nothing but waste the resources of the litigants in the action before the court, delay
resolution of disputes between other litigants, squander scarce judicial resources, and damage the
integrity and the public's perception of the federal judicial system.").
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litigation. 143 As one court stated "[t]he courts-public, tax-supported
institutions--cannot be used to vent
spleen or passion amongst feuding
144
bar."'
the
of
members
and
parties
E. The Federal Courts' Use of Sanctions
to Address Attorney Misconduct
What is most revealing about a judge's attitude toward attorney
misconduct is what sanction he or she imposes on an offending attorney.
Why one judge chooses to impose one sanction when confronted with
certain behavior and another judge, confronted with similar behavior,
chooses another sanction, or no sanction at all, is unclear from a review
of written opinions. The varying results probably have as much to do
with the circumstances of each case as they do with the particular
judge's views on attorney conduct and his or her role in regulating it, the
history of the litigation, the reputation of the attorney and innumerable
other factors not obvious on the face of the opinion.
Although it is difficult to establish a clear definition of what type of
sanction will be used and when, several patterns do emerge. A judge's
choice of sanction often reflects the judge's perception of the impact of
the conduct on the underlying litigation as well as the integrity of the
judicial system: the broader the impact, the harsher the sanction. If an
attorney's conduct is perceived as adversarial excess that merely
affected the current litigation, a "lighter" sanction will be imposed. In
those instances, courts will impose a sanction designed to make the other
side whole such as the payment of costs and fees. In contrast, if the
attorney's conduct is viewed as undermining the integrity of the judicial
system as a whole then a court will impose more severe and often
multiple sanctions.
Federal courts are armed with a large arsenal of possible sanctions
designed to protect both the litigation process and the broader judicial
system. Sanctions can be loosely defined by two broad categories:
traditional sanctions and informal sanctions. Traditional sanctions are
often rule-based and encompass the long-established responses to
attorney misconduct such as the assessment of fees and costs,
disqualification, and referral to a disciplinary committee, which can

143. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Sweeney Corp., 792 F.2d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per
curiam); Lewis v. Brown & Root, Inc., 711 F.2d 1287, 1291 (5th Cir. 1983); Dreis & Krump Mfg,
Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 802 F.2d 247, 255 (2d Cir. 1975).
144. Jenkins v. Tatum, 795 F.2d 112, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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suspend or disbar the attorney from the particular federal court's bar.
These sanctions are designed primarily to ensure the integrity of the
system and regulate conduct before the court.
In contrast, informal sanctions are not rooted in rules or statutes,
nor are they recognized as "official" responses to attorney conduct.
Informal sanctions include a court's decision to issue an opinion, naming
the recalcitrant attorney, outlining his or her misdeeds in detail, and
describing the court's disappointment and outrage. Informal sanctions do
not employ the state or federal disciplinary machinery or rely on
disciplinary mechanisms described in rules or statutes. Instead they
combine the power of the written word with the importance of an
attorney's reputation to impress upon an attorney (and the bar) the
gravity of the conduct. And unlike traditional sanctions, informal
sanctions are more efficient because they do not entail an adherence to
due process requirements.
While traditional sanctions provide federal courts an avenue for
addressing and deterring attorney misconduct, informal sanctions allow
courts to reveal to the bar their vision of attorney conduct. Unlike
traditional sanctions, which require a court to defend its action based on
the conduct before it, informal sanctions allow a court to speak more
broadly-a podium-about an attorney's responsibility to the system.
Pendleton v. Central New Mexico CorrectionalFacility145 provides a
recent illustration. The court in Pendleton lacked a traditional basis for
sanctions but observed "the conduct of Plaintiffs counsel deserves
mention."' 46 The court went on to express a common sentiment:
Practicing law transcends gamesmanship and making a buck. We
should be trying to make a difference. The profession is more than a
business, and should remain so. As professionals we should, while
trying to solve our client's problems, make every effort to avoid
needless litigation. The conduct 1employed
in this case certainly was
47
not calculated to achieve that end.

145. 184 F.R.D. 637 (D.N.M. 1999).
146. Id. at 641.
147. Id.; see also Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1546 (11th Cir 1993) ("The
discovery rules in particular were intended to promote the search for truth that is the heart of our
judicial system. However, the success with which the rules are applied towards this search for truth
greatly depends on the professionalism and integrity of the attorneys involved. Therefore, it is
appalling that attorneys, like defense counsel in this case, routinely twist the discovery rules into
some of 'the most powerful weapons in the arsenal of those who abuse the adversary system for the
sole benefit of their clients."').
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While traditional sanctions and informal sanctions are often used in
tandem, it is through informal sanctions that courts communicate
directly with the attorneys148 and the bar. 149 Courts attempt to describe
150
and establish norms of conduct and to guide the bar's behavior.
Because courts are speaking directly to the bar, informal sanctions offer
a window into the federal bench's attitude toward attorney misconduct.
Again and again, courts emphasize through informal sanctions that an
attorney's foremost obligation is to the judicial system. 151 Sanctions52are
frequently assessed when attorneys fail to maintain this perspective.
F. Final Comments on Federal CourtJudicialAttitudes Toward
RegulatingAttorney Conduct
By looking at what judges do-the sanctions imposed-when
confronted with attorney conduct and the language they use in imposing
those sanctions, we see a picture of judges who are not aggressively
seeking to regulate the legal profession as a whole. The concerns for the
legal profession are derivative of the dominant concern for the integrity
of the judicial proceeding in front of the judge. Within that narrower
context, judges reflect an often deep concern for misconduct, both
because it harms the integrity of the proceeding and adversely affects the
legal profession. While this conclusion may seem obvious, it reflects at
148. See Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 239 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1034 (D. Mont. 2003) ("[Sutter's]
actions were contemptuous, necessitated a mistrial, and caused undue expense and delay to Lasar,
his counsel, the witnesses, and the Court. In trying to defend his actions, he has been dishonest,
misleading, and evasive. In short, he is not the type of attorney that should be practicing in this
Court. At some point, Lawrence Sutter needs to reflect on what he does, and what it is he should do.
The law has no room for frustrated advocates, motivated by an attitude to win at any cost, who are
intent to take matters in their own hands, without regard to the rules or orders of the Court.").
149. See United States v. Martin, 195 F.3d 961, 969-70 (7th Cir. 1999) ("We do not think
formal disciplinary action required [sic] in the circumstances, but we take this opportunity to remind
the bar of its duty to avoid needless duplication in the briefing of multiple-party appeals."); Zal v.
Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 1992) ("During a trial, lawyers must speak, each in his own
time and within his allowed time, and with relevance and moderation. These are such obvious
matters that we should not remind the bar of them were it nor for the misconceptions manifest in
this case.").
150. See Fla. Breckenridge, Inc. v. Solvay Pharms., Inc., No. 98-4606, 1999 WL 292667, at *4
(11 th Cir. May 11, 1999) ("Unfortunately, we must remind these attorneys that they are officers of
the court. As such, they 'owe duties of complete candor and primary loyalty to the court before
which they practice.' These duties are never subservient to a lawyer's duty to advocate zealously for
his or her client. In this case, the attorneys for both parties have frustrated the system of justice,
which depends on their candor and loyalty to the court, because they wanted to avoid an unpleasant
truth about their clients' conduct. 'In short, they have sold out to the client."' (citations omitted)).
151. See infra Part IV.
152. See In re Sealed Appellant, 194 F.3d 666, 674 (5th Cir. 1999).
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least one reason why federal courts have not pushed for the
federalization
of legal ethics or the creation of federal rules of attorney
53
conduct.'
IV.

A.

STATE COURT ATTITUDES TOWARD ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT

TheoreticalDifference Between Federaland State Courts

If we are rightly concerned that the published opinions from federal
courts offer only a partial picture of judicial attitudes, this concern is
exacerbated at the state level because opinions of state trial courts are
often unpublished. Consequently, we were required to rely largely on
state appellate court opinions, removing us one step from the trial court
judges who most often are the ones confronting directly the alleged
misconduct. In addition, we were dealing with a much larger body of
cases and the inevitable problem of generalizing from a wide range of
published opinions.
We initially theorized that there would be differences between how
federal and state court judges view their responsibility in regulating
attorney conduct. State courts traditionally have supervisory
responsibility over the legal profession within their states.' 54 Because of
their position within the state legal system and their role in promulgating
rules of professional responsibility, state judges are more closely
associated with the state bar and the state attorney conduct apparatus
than are their federal counterparts. This formal responsibility over the
legal profession would suggest that state judges would exercise greater
vigilance over the conduct of attorneys to whom the courts have given
permission to practice. 155
Our research, however, has not discerned any major differences,
and, in fact, highlights parallel concerns among federal and state court
judges. Despite some differences in particular views and actions, in
153. This lack of a push by federal judges to create a comprehensive ethics code may explain
why court opinions do not provide a clear or coherent vision of the source of power to regulate
attorney conduct. See generally Zacharias & Green, supranote 2.
154. See infra Part IV.B.
155. In State v. Wade, 839 A.2d 559, 566 (Vt. 2003), Justice Johnson, in his concurring
opinion, expressed that, because of the state supreme court's ultimate responsibility under the state
constitution to oversee the ethical conduct of attorneys and the court's role in promulgating the rules
of ethics for attorneys, the court must be "'particularly vigilant' when reviewing cases where an
attorney's conduct raises a substantial question about whether that conduct conforms to the rules of
ethics we have promulgated to protect the public."
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general the larger philosophical concerns regarding the judge's role in
regulating attorney conduct appear to be very similar, namely ensuring
fair, just and efficient proceedings and maintaining the integrity of the
judicial system. State courts may be somewhat more likely to refer to
upholding the honor of the legal profession. State court opinions
reviewed include much of the same, broad philosophical language as the
federal court opinions described in the previous section. Moreover, the
nature and extent of sanction levied on an offending attorney often
depends on the perceived impact of the behavior on the underlying
proceedings and the integrity of the judicial system as a whole. It is
important to note, however, that regulation of attorney conduct is very
case-specific and fact-intensive. As the discussion below suggests, state
courts can vary considerably in their actions and views not only across
jurisdictions but also, more surprisingly, even within a particular
jurisdiction.
B.

The Power andDuty to Regulate in State Court Practice

As in the federal court system, it is clear that state courts have the
authority to supervise the conduct of lawyers who appear before them. In
most states, if not all, the state's supreme court is the ultimate arbiter of
attorney regulation and discipline.1 56 The source of a state supreme
court's authority is often
the state constitution itself, 57 or otherwise
1 58
law.
derived from case
Although many opinions cite to the state supreme court's exclusive
authority to discipline attorneys for misconduct, the power to regulate
and oversee attorney conduct has been well-established to be within the
auspices of any state court, including state trial courts that are entrusted
with the duty to preserve an impartial forum, protect the litigation

156. See Barton, supra note 1, at 1185.
157.

See, e.g., Pantori, Inc. v. Stephenson, 384 So. 2d 1357, 1358-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

(finding that the state constitution gave the Florida Supreme Court the power to discipline
attorneys); Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Rubin, 510 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ohio 1987) (citing the state
constitution as a source of authority to regulate attorney conduct); Wade, 839 A.2d at 565 (Johnson,
J. concurring) (noting that the duty to oversee the ethics of attorneys admitted to practice arose from
the Constitution).
158. See, e.g., In re Discipline of Stanton, 446 N.W.2d 33, 42 (S.D. 1989) (noting that "[t]he
ultimate decision for discipline of members of the State Bar rests with this court."); Clinard v.
Blackwood, 46 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tenn. 2001) (stating that the court is responsible for enforcing and
upholding the standards of professional responsibility); see also In re Laprath, 670 N.W.2d 41, 55
(S.D. 2003) ("The final determination for the appropriate discipline of a member of the State Bar
rests firmly with the wisdom of this Court.").
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process and maintain courtroom order and decorum. 159 As the Florida
Supreme Court observed, "who better than judges, who have daily
interaction with attorneys, to keep a proverbial finger on the pulse of
attorney conduct?" 160 Court rules are occasionally referenced as the
source of such authority. 16 1 More often, however, opinions refer to long
tradition and case law establishing an inherent power necessary for the
proper and efficient administration of justice. 162 Some courts even cite
federal court cases as support for the inherent authority possessed by all
courts.163 In addition, as noted in Part II, courts have referred to the
159. See, e.g., Pantori, Inc., 384 So. 2d at 1359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that
although the state supreme court has the exclusive power to discipline attorneys, the trial court has
the authority to initiate appropriate disciplinary action and, to preserve an impartial forum, could
constitutionally remove an attorney from a case given sufficient facts); Spivey v. Bender, 601
N.E.2d 56, 58 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) ("While the Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction
over admission to the practice of law and discipline of persons so admitted, a trial court retains the
'authority and duty to see to the ethical conduct of attorneys in proceedings before it."') (quoting
Hahn v. Boeing Co., 621 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Wash. 1980)).
160. 5-H Corp. v. Padavano, 708 So. 2d 244, 247 n.8 (Fla. 1997); see also Quinones v. State,
766 So. 2d 1165, 1172 n.9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
161. See, e.g., Lipin v. Bender, 644 N.E.2d 1300, 1303 (N.Y. 1994) (Without addressing the
question as to whether the trial court had inherent authority to punish attorneys for "intolerable
behavior that, unredressed, threatens the entire litigation process," the New York Court of Appeals
pointed to the trial court's authority under the procedural rules of court, in that case the rule
governing the subject of protective orders that "confers broad discretion upon a court to fashion
appropriate remedies both where abuses are threatened ...and where they have already occurred.");
R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1080 (Utah 1997)
(referencing to authority under Rule I I of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure).
162. See, e.g., Avelino-Wright v. Wright, 742 N.E.2d 578, 582 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (citing
New England Novelty Co. v. Sandberg, 54 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Mass. 1944), the Massachusetts
Appeals Court acknowledged, "[t]here is no question that both the power to sanction and the power
of contempt are derived from the same source, namely the inherent power of a court to do what is
necessary to secure the administration of justice."); Evans & Luptak, PLC v. Lizza, 650 N.W.2d
364, 368 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (citing a case as far back as 1850, the Michigan Court of Appeals
underscored the state's "long tradition of judicial oversight of the ethical conduct of its court
officers"); Sullivan County Reg'l Refuse Disposal Dist. v. Town of Acworth, 686 A.2d 755, 757
(N.H. 1996) (citing case law, the court emphasized that the courts of New Hampshire are the
"primary regulators of attorney conduct"); Couch v. Private Diagnostic Clinic, 554 S.E.2d. 356, 362
(N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (citing several cases, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reaffirmed the trial
court's "inherent authority to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the proper
administration of justice," a power that "is essential to the court's existence and the orderly and
efficient administration of justice" and includes the authority to address attorney conduct, which "is
based upon the relationship of the attorney to the court and the authority which the court has over its
own officers to prevent them from, or punish them for, committing acts of dishonesty or
impropriety") (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 510 N.E.2d
at 382. Clinard v. Blackwood, 46 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tenn. 2001).
163. For example, in Couch, 554 S.E.2d at 363, the North Carolina Court of Appeals rested
much of its authority not only on prior state cases but on the seminal Supreme Court case of
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991). The North Carolina court placed much stock in the
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state's code of64judicial conduct as further, often additional, support for
this authority.'
This power to regulate and oversee includes the power to
sanction. 165 Efficiency and fairness is the dominant theme sounded by a
large number of state court opinions. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina's approach is illustrative:
There is no question that a Superior Court, as part of its inherent
powers to manage its affairs, to see that justice is done, and to see that
the administration of justice is accomplished as expeditiously as
possible, has the authority to impose reasonable
166 and appropriate
sanctions upon errant lawyers practicing before it.

Practically speaking, "[t]he basic purpose of the trial court is to
afford litigants an impartial forum in which their complaints
and
167
defenses may be presented, heard and decided with fairness.'5
The power to sanction, however, is not absolute, and appellate
courts have reviewed sanctions (and in some instances overturned them)
for abuse of discretion, 68 reasonableness, 169 appropriateness of fit to the
United States Supreme Court's ieaffirmation that "all courts have inherent authority to punish
lawyers for '.. .disobedience to the orders of the Judiciary, regardless of whether such disobedience
interfered with the conduct of trial."' Couch, 554 S.E.2d at 363 (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44);
see also Sullivan County Reg'l Refuse DisposalDist., 686 A.2d at 757-58 (citing, among others, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' hands-on approach and rejecting outright the Second Circuit's more
restrained approach).
164. See Evans & Luptak, PLC, 650 N.W.2d at 368 (noting that the long tradition of judicial
oversight of attorney conduct "is consistent with the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct Canon
3(B)(3)"); Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 510 N.E.2d at 383 ("Indeed we hasten to approve and encourage
courts throughout this state in their efforts to halt unprofessional conduct and meet their
responsibilities in reporting violations of the Code."); see also AIG Haw. Ins. Co. v. Bateman, 923
P.2d 395, 402 (Haw. 1996); Granholm v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 625 N.W.2d 16, 21 (Mich. Ct. App.
2000); Spivey v. Bender, 601 N.E.2d 56, 59 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) State v. Wade, 839 A.2d 559,
563 (Vt. 2003) (Johnson, J., concurring).
165. See, e.g., Avelino- Wright, 742 N.E.2d at 5 (holding that trial courts can sanction attorneys
for disobedience of court order or for conduct which disrespects the authority of the court or
obstructs the underlying legal proceedings); Byrnes v. Baca, 54 P.3d 996, 1002-03 (N.M. Ct. App.
2002) (affirming the trial judge's authority to hold in contempt or to sanction attorneys); R&R
Energies, 936 P.2d at 1080-81 (finding that Rule 11 gives trial court authority to impose sanctions
against an attorney whose dilatory tactics through entire litigation were improper and oppressive).
166. Couch, 554 S.E.2d at 363.
167. Pantori, Inc. v. Stephenson, 384 So. 2d 1357, 1359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
168. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 616 A.2d 288, 291 (Del. 1992) (trial judge's action must be
"within the realm of sound judicial discretion"); Quinones v. State, 766 So. 2d 1165, 1171-72 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (taking all circumstances into consideration, trial court must exercise "sound
discretion" and is to be given great deference); Couch, 554 S.E.2d at 362 (finding that the abuse of
discretion standard is well-established); Spivey, 601 N.E.2d at 61 (finding that the trial court abused
its discretion by sanctioning the attorney); R&R Energies, 936 P.2d at 1080-81 (appellate court will
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alleged misconduct, 170 and/or lack of due process. 17 As with federal
courts, while the decision to sanction is given wide deference, the
severity of the sanction often receives more rigorous review. The
analysis is extremely fact-intensive and conducted on a case-by-case
basis, but overall, appellate courts generally defer to the judgments of
their trial court counterparts. 172 Nevertheless,
some jurisdictions grant
173
more deference to trial courts than do others.
Possessing the authority to regulate may be one thing; however,
embracing the duty to regulate and exercising that authority may be yet
another. Once again, reviewing court decisions may provide some
insight into the attitudes and perceptions of judges with respect to the
perceived duty to regulate. As one court stated, the inherent authority
courts have "encompasses not only the 'power but also the duty to
affirm trial court's sanctions against an attorney absent abuse of discretion); Gum v. Dudley, 505
S.E.2d 391, 404 (W. Va. 1997) (holding sanctions for violations of general duty of candor are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion); see also Covington v. Smith, 582 S.E.2d 756, 762-63 (W. Va.
2003).
169. See, e.g., Couch, 554 S.E.2d at 363 (noting that a trial court has "authority to impose
reasonableand appropriatesanctions upon errant lawyers practicing before it" (emphasis added)).
170. See, e.g., Avelino-Wright, 742 N.E.2d at 583 (noting that when imposing monetary
sanctions, the trial court may impose sanctions in whatever amount it "considers reasonably related
to any squandering of judicial resources or needless legal expenses incurred"); Byrnes v. Baca, 54
P.3d 996, 1007-08 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that sanctions should fit the misconduct and
whatever action the court takes should be supported by findings of fact); R&R Energies, 936 P.2d at
1080-81 (finding that the sanction imposed by the trial court fit the requirements of this particular
case).
171. See, e.g., Avelino-Wright, 742 N.E.2d at 582 (finding that the trial court must provide
sufficient hearing on the matter for attorney to respond to the charges levied against her); Clark v.
Clark, 716 N.E.2d 144, 154 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (court must provide an attorney with fair notice,
the opportunity to be heard, and complete basis for particular sanction given); Byrnes, 54 P.3d at
1005-06 (lack of sufficient notice given prior to suspending attorney).
172. As one court suggested, the trial judge is in the best position to observe the jurors,
witnesses and attorneys in order to assess attorney conduct and its impact. See Quinones, 766 So. 2d
at 1172 n.9.
173. See Quinones, 766 So. 2d at 1172 n.9, cf Couch, 554 S.E.2d at 367 (In a matter where an
attorney lied to the court about her previous disciplinary history, revocation of the attorney's pro
hac vice status in all North Carolina cases, suspension of that status for one year, and the court's
decision to report attorney to state bars in other jurisdictions was upheld.); see also Quinones 766
So. 2d at 1171-72 (court's order of mistrial affirmed where defense counsel's conduct undermined
fairness of trial). Compare Pantori, Inc. v. Stephenson, 384 So. 2d 1357, 1359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (holding that where respondent's attorneys formerly represented the petitioner in a related
subject matter, trial court could disqualify the attorney from case), with Spivey' 601 N.E.2d at 58-59
(although trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to disqualify counsel, it must
exercise that discretion wisely and only if attorney misconduct taints proceedings, even where
attorneys' former representation of opposing party may result in appearance of impropriety), and
Harris,616 A.2d at 292-93 (trial court abused discretion when it dismissed indictment on the basis
of prosecutor's failure to prosecute and comply with court's scheduling orders).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

35

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 15

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1425

discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, for unprofessional
conduct."" 7 4 Other courts sometimes refer to the duty as an ethical one

under the appropriate canons. 175 Although most courts may agree that a
duty does in fact exist to some degree, some 176
courts appear to be more
duty.
active
an
assume
to
others
than
reluctant
The federal court debate discussed in Part III.C on whether to take a
hands-off or more active approach in regulating attorney conduct has

percolated over to a few state courts. As we had theorized, two of the
courts that have most directly addressed that debate have rejected the
Second Circuit's more restrained approach that leaves the enforcement
of ethics codes to the bar's existing disciplinary machinery, and instead
favor the Fifth Circuit's more proactive stance.

77

In fact, the New

Hampshire Supreme Court, in accepting the role as general overseer of
lawyer ethics, stated in no uncertain terms:

174. Couch, 554 S.E.2d at 362 (quoting In re Hunoval, 247 S.E.2d 230, 233 (N.C. 1977)).
175. See In re Eicher, 661 N.W.2d 354, 370 (S.D. 2003) (finding that where the trial judge
receives information indicating substantial likelihood that a lawyer has committed a violation of the
code of professional responsibility, "simple communication with the lawyer satisfies the judge's
ethical duty"); Covington v. Smith, 582 S.E.2d 756, 772 (W. Va. 2003) (holding that the court has a
duty under judicial canon 3D(2) to refer matters of attorney misconduct, here neglect of case, to the
Office of Disciplinary Counsel); cf In re Laprath, 670 N.W.2d 41, 63 (S.D. 2003) ("Among the
administrative responsibilities imposed on a judge in Canon 3, therefore, is that of taking or
initiating appropriate disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of
which the judge may become aware. Thus, a judge exposes himself or herself to the disciplinary
action for failure to report the misconduct of other judges or attorneys to attorney disciplinary
bodies and judicial conduct commissions.").
176. Compare R&R Energies, 936 P.2d at 1081 (Zimmerman, C.J., concurring) ("The only
way that the public's misperception of the vast majority of honest, conscientious, and ethical
lawyers will ever be corrected is if individual judges and lawyers are willing to overcome a natural
resistance to being perceived as troublemakers and vigorously fulfill their sworn duty to refer to
disciplinary counsel lawyers who evidence patterns of improper and oppressive litigation tactics."),
and Sullivan County Reg'l Refuse Disposal Dist. v. Town of Acworth, 686 A.2d 755, 757 (N.H.
1996) ("It would be inconsistent with this court's supervisory role to relegate the Rules of
Professional Conduct to the status of guidelines, to be enforced only when the trial process may be
sullied."), with Fravel v. Haughey, 727 So. 2d 1033, 1036-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (court
refuses to undertake a direct, independent policing role), State v. Wade, 839 A.2d 559, 561-62 (Vt.
2003) (finding that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the defendant's conviction
where discovery violations by the prosecutor did not prejudice the defendant), and Spivey, 601
N.E.2d at 58-59 ("[T]he law requires the [court's] discretion to be exercised wisely .... The issue
arising from the application of [lawyers' ethical] ... standards cannot be resolved in a vacuum, and
the ethical rules should not be blindly applied without consideration of relative hardships."); see
also Wade, 839 A.2d at 565 (Vt. 2003) (Johnson, J. concurring) (recognizing that it is difficult for
trial judges to make complaints against lawyers with whom they must work on a daily basis).
177. See Sullivan County Reg 'l Refuse DisposalDist., 686 A.2d at 757; Clinard v. Blackwood,
46 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tenn. 2001).
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[The Second Circuit's] approach has been rejected by a majority of the
courts that have considered the issue, and we reject it today.... The
courts of this State are the primary regulators of attorney conduct....
It would be inconsistent with this court's supervisory role to relegate
the Rules of Professional Conduct to the status of guidelines, to be
enforced only when the trial process may be sullied.178
Such language reinforces the expectation that state courts would
tend to be more vigilant and active regulators than their federal

counterparts. As with the federal courts, the practice does not seem to
follow the rhetoric. Despite its claim that the majority of courts have
rejected the more restrained approach, the New Hampshire court cites

but a few supporting cases and, more importantly, only one state case.
Moreover, the language in the opinions of other state cases indicate a
less-than-enthusiastic attitude towards judicial regulation of attorney
conduct, especially if it requires vacating or reversing verdicts upon a
determination that the attorney for the prevailing party had violated rules
of professional responsibility.179 Overall, taking a broader view of all the
cases leads to the conclusion that state courts, like their federal
counterparts, generally take a more hybrid approach towards regulating
attorney conduct, primarily addressing egregious conduct that threatens
the entire litigation process and undermines the judicial system.
How appellate courts treat a trial court's failure to act upon
allegations of serious misconduct also provides some insight into how
judges in a particular jurisdiction view judicial regulation of attorney
conduct. For example, appellate courts on occasion have used strong
language to admonish a trial court judge for not taking action when

confronted with egregious misbehavior. 180 In other cases, despite serious
178. Sullivan County Reg 7 Refuse Disposal Dist., 686 A.2d at 757 (citations omitted).
179. See, e.g., Fravel, 727 So. 2d at 1037 (finding that where underlying proceedings were not
tainted by misconduct, taking an active, "policing role would go well beyond the requirements of
Canon 3D(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct ... and create a demand for significant increases in
judicial resources").
180. See, e.g., Badalamenti v. William Beaumont Hospital-Troy, 602 N.W.2d 854, 861-62
(Mich. Ct. App. 1999) ("Unfortunately, the record makes it abundantly clear that although the trial
court recognized the impropriety of the conduct of plaintiff's lead trial counsel, the court was either
unwilling or unable to control counsel's conduct.... Particularly disturbing to this Court is that in
response to defendants' postjudgment motion for a new trial based on the misconduct of plaintiffs
lead trial counsel, the trial court acknowledged that it 'had great problems with the conduct of
counsel during the trial' and could not 'condone many things that happened during this trial,' ... but
the trial court then declined to even rule on the claim of misconduct.... The trial court has a duty to
assure that the parties before it receive a fair trial. The court in this case did not fulfill this duty and
left it to this Court to grant defendants the relief to which they are entitled."(citations omitted)); see
also State v. Rivera, 514 S.E.2d 720, 723 (N.C. 1999) (regarding disparaging comments made by
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allegations of attorney misconduct, appellate courts have concluded that
the trial court's inaction and failure to report the matter to the
appropriate state bar was not subject to appellate review.18 As with
federal circuit courts, state appellate courts have felt obligated to take
action, for example by initiating a referral to the state bar disciplinary
authority, 18 2 remanding the matter to the trial court to determine the
83 or even setting aside a large jury verdict. 184
appropriate sanction,
Indeed, at least one appellate judge has suggested that it may be more
appropriate, or at least easier, for an appellate 185
court than a trial court to
refer an attorney to the appropriate authorities.
C. Rationalefor State CourtActions Regulating Attorney Conduct
Many of the rationales espoused by state courts when regulating
attorney conduct are the same as those emphasized by their federal court
counterparts. Often, state courts provide multiple reasons to support their
decision to sanction or report an attorney. First and foremost, courts are
primarily concerned with providing a fair, efficient, and impartial forum
for disputes. Courts abhor conduct that interferes with and taints the

prosecutor against opposing counsel, state supreme court concluded that "the trial court's comments
were not enough" and admonished trial courts to take seriously their duty to make sure that the
mandates of the rules are strictly complied with in all cases and to impose appropriate sanctions if
they are not); Gum v. Dudley, 505 S.E.2d 391, 403 (W. Va. 1997) (In addressing the trial court's
failure to consider an attorney's general duty of candor, the court states, "[w]henever a duty is
imposed it must be accompanied by an appropriate remedy or sanction for a violation of the duty.
Not to provide a remedy or sanction renders the duty meaningless.").
181. See, e.g., Theriault v. J.S. & G. Asphalt, Inc., 617 So. 2d 437, 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993) ("[W]e do not believe the trial court's failure to report this matter to the Florida Bar is subject
to appellate review.").
182. See Quinones v. State, 766 So. 2d 1165, 1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); AIG Haw. Ins.
Co. v. Bateman, 923 P.2d 395, 402 (Haw. 1996); R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc.,
936 P.2d 1068, 1081-82 (Utah 1997) (Zimmerman, C.J. concurring); Wade, 839 A.2d. at 562-66
(Johnson, J. concurring); Covington v. Smith, 582 S.E.2d 756, 772 (W. Va. 2003); Gum, 505 S.E.2d
at 405.
183. See Gum, 505 S.E.2d at 405 (remanding the matter of an attorney's conduct to the trial
court for appropriate consideration after finding that the trial court failed to address the issue of the
attorney's general duty of candor to the court regarding a settlement agreement).
184. See Badalamenti,602 N.W.2d at 856 ($15 million verdict set aside).
185. See Wade, 839 A.2d at 565 (Johnson, J., concurring) ("Indeed, we recognize that it is
difficult for trial judges to make complaints to the Professional Responsibility Program against
lawyers with whom they have to work on a day to day basis. That neither defense counsel nor the
trial judge here chose to make the referral does not mean that this Court should also decline to do
so. We are more removed from the working relationship between district court judges and the
attorneys practicing before them. I am, therefore, referring this matter to the Professional
Responsibility Program for further investigation and appropriate action.").
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underlying proceedings. 86 Related to that concern, they want to
maintain civility, courtroom order and decorum, and protect the interests
of all litigants. 187 Towards those ends, courts will sanction or report
attorneys for, among other things, ignoring the court's evidentiary
rulings, making improper and highly prejudicial remarks during trial,
behaving uncivilly, engaging in conduct intended to divert the jurors'
attention from the merits of the case, and abusing the discovery process
in a way that threatens the fairness of the entire litigation process.
Like the federal courts, state courts are also very concerned with
conduct that undermines or erodes the integrity of the judicial system
and the public's confidence in the legal system,' 88 wastes judicial
resources,1 89 and dishonors the legal profession or otherwise adversely
impacts the public's perception of the bar,' 90 which are all very often
186. See, e.g., Johnnides v. Amoco Oil Co., 778 So. 2d 443, 443 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001);
Quinones, 766 So. 2d at 1171-72; Badalamenti, 602 N.W.2d at 861-62; Lipin v. Bender, 644 N.E.2d
1300, 1303 (N.Y. 1994); Clinard v. Blackwood, 46 S.W.3d 177, 187-88 (Tenn. 2001); Wasielewski
v. K Mart Corp., 891 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); Lemons v. Commonwealth, 420
S.E.2d 525, 528 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (Benton, J., dissenting); see also Fravel v. Haughey, 727 So.
2d 1033, 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (sanctions vacated where there was no evidence that
misconduct tainted proceedings); Bell v. Seabury, 622 N.W.2d 347, 352 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000)
(reversing the trial court's sanctions after finding that "there was no nexus between the misconduct"
and the tainted proceedings); infra note 207.
187. See, e.g., 5-H Corp. v. Padovano, 708 So. 2d 244, 246-47 (Fla. 1997); Byrnes v. Baca, 54
P.3d 996,1007-08 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002); Covington, 582 S.E.2d at 762.
188. See Johnson v. Johnson, 948 S.W.2d 835, 840 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) ("Confidence in our
legal system is undermined when attorneys are allowed to assail a judge personally rather than
addressing the legal issues at hand."); see, e.g., Quinones, 766 So. 2d 1165 at 1167 (sanctioning the
attorney for disregarding court orders and rulings; making improper and prejudicial comments
during proceedings; making derogatory and disparaging comments about judge and opposing
counsel and witnesses; failing to disclose evidence pursuant to discovery rules); Avelino-Wright v.
Wright, 742 N.E.2d 578, 581 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (noting that the attorney was "making a
mockery" of the legal proceeding by directing client not to cooperate with GAL; challenging
integrity of judges and appointed experts; exhibiting a lack of professionalism in advocacy; filing
"vexatious and harassing motions"); see also In re Discipline of Stanton, 446 N.W.2d 33, 42 (S.D.
1989); Clinard,46 S.W.3d at 182, 187.
189. See, e.g., Avelino-Wright, 742 N.E.2d at 582 (noting that any monetary award given in a
case should correspond to the resources wasted as a result of the misconduct); Clark v. Clark, 716
N.E.2d 144, 151 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (impeding the efficient administration of justice by walking
out of court on final day of trial); AIG Haw. Ins. Co. v. Bateman, 923 P.2d 395, 401-02 (Haw.
1996) (failing to disclose to the court the material fact of settlement wastes time and limited
resources of court and denies availability of courts to deserving litigants); R&R Energies v. Mother
Earth Industries, Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1081 (Utah 1997) (engaging in "dilatory tactics" and filing
pleadings that were not relevant or productive, with the sole purpose of harassing or causing
unnecessary delay or needless increase in cost of litigation).
190. See 5-H Corp., 708 So. 2d at 246-47 (finding lack of professionalism, including making
unfounded accusations of bias against judges and inappropriately attacking opposing counsel's
arguments using expletives); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Briscoe, 745 A.2d 1037, 1043-44
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inexorably linked to unprofessional conduct that threatens the fairness of
the underlying proceeding. Occasionally, although less predominantly,
9
state courts also refer to their role as overseer of lawyer ethics.' 1
Although the importance of controlling the proceedings before
them and maintaining the integrity and efficiency of the legal system
appear to provide the primary justifications for responding to attorney
misconduct, state courts appear to cite to the Code of Judicial Conduct
and compliance with the judicial canons more often than the federal
courts do, and usually as a means to provide additional support to justify
their action. Rarely is it the only justification for addressing misconduct.
As discussed in Part II, whether the judicial code represents an ethical
duty 192 to address attorney misconduct or merely encourages action as

(Md. 2000) (inter alia, unlawfully representing a client while decertified; failing to appear in court;
failing to produce records; commingling client funds); In re Lapreth, 670 N.W.2d 41, 64 (S.D.
2003) (providing incompetent legal services); In re Stanton, 446 N.W.2d at 36 (noting eight cases of
misconduct, including, among others, ignorance of the law, lying to the court, and betraying client
confidences); Clinard,46 S.W.3d at 187; R&R Energies, 936 P.2d at 1081. In State v. Rivera, 514
S.E.2d 720, 723 (N.C. 1999), the Court lamented that,
We have viewed with concern the apparent decline in civility in our trial courts. This
Court shall not tolerate, and our trial courts must not tolerate, comments in court by one
lawyer tending to disparage the personality or performance of another. Such comments
tend to reduce public trust and confidence in our courts and, in more extreme cases,
directly interfere with the truth-finding function by distracting judges and juries from the
serious business at hand. We admonish our trial courts to take seriously their duty to
insure that the mandates of Rule 12 [of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior
and District Courts] are strictly complied with in all cases and to impose appropriate
sanctions if they are not.
191. See, e.g., Evans & Luptak, PLC v. Lizza, 650 N.W.2d 364, 369 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002);
Sullivan County Reg'l Refuse Disposal Dist. v. Town of Acworth, 686 A.2d 755, 757 (N.H. 1996);
State v. Wade, 839 A.2d 559, 565-66 (Vt. 2003) (Johnson, J., concurring).
192. See, e.g., Quinones v. State, 766 So. 2d 1165, 1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that
Canon D of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to take a appropriate action when aware
of attorney misconduct); Couch v. Private Diagnostic Clinic, 554 S.E.2d 356, 362 (N.C. Ct. App.
2001) (stating that Canon 3(B)(3) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct imposes a duty on
the court to discipline attorneys for unprofessional conduct); In re Laprath, 670 N.W.2d 41, 63-64
(S.D. 2003) (noting that Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that judges take or
initiate appropriate disciplinary measures); Covington v. Smith, 582 S.E.2d 756, 772 (W. Va. 2003)
(finding that it was the court's obligation to refer the attorney misconduct to the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel); see also AIG Haw. Ins. Co. v. Bateman, 923 P.2d 395, 402 (Haw. 1996)
(explaining that Hawaii's Supreme Court was "compelled to refer the record of this case to the
[Office of Disciplinary Counsel] for its review and appropriate action" as a result of attorney's
probable violation of rules of professional conduct); Johnson v. Johnson, 948 S.W.2d 835, 841
(Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the court is bound by Canon 3D(2) to inform state bar of attorey
misconduct); Gonzalez v. State, 768 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that the Code of
Judicial Conduct requires judge to initiate disciplinary action in the case of prosecutorial
misconduct).
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good judicial practice' 93 remains a question. Citation to the Code of
Judicial Conduct as a justification for action is sometimes
noncommittal. 194 Nevertheless, state courts occasionally do cite to
Canon 3, particularly to support a referral to the state bar disciplinary
apparatus. 195
D. Imposing Sanctions to Address Attorney Misconduct
The sanctions imposed by state courts on attorneys range widely
and, as in the federal courts, may include fines, assessment of fees and
1 96
costs, disqualification, referral to state bar, and public reprimand.
Often, more than one of these sanctions will apply.t 97 As with federal

193. See, e.g., Bell v. Seabury, 622 N.W.2d 347, 352 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that under
Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct a judge observes attorney misconduct he may pursue
disciplinary action); Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Rubin, 510 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ohio 1987) (encouraging
courts to stop unprofessional conduct by reporting violations as indicated under Canon 3B(3) of the
Code of Judicial Conduct); see also State v. Wade, 839 A.2d 559, at 565-66 (Vt. 2003) (Johnson, J.
concurrence).
194. See, e.g., 5-H Corp., 708 So. 2d at 246-47 (Citing Canon 3D(2) as additional support for
the decision to report an attorney to the state bar, the court refers to reporting to the Florida Bar any
professional misconduct of a fellow attorney as an obligation; however, the court later goes on to
actively encourage such reporting.); see also R&R Energies, 936 P.2d at 1081-82 (Zimmerman,
C.J., concurring).
195. Note that all the matters in footnotes 191-93 supra, are cases in which the courts
discussed referring attorney misconduct to the appropriate state bar disciplinary authorities. In fact,
in one case, in addition to levying sanctions against the attorney within the state of North Carolina,
the court reported the attorney to the bars of two other states where she practiced. See Couch, 544
S.E.2d at 367. For further discussion regarding judicial ethical obligations, refer to text
accompanying footnotes 36-37, supra Part II.C. on "Judicial Ethics Obligation to Report to the
Bar."
196. See, e.g., Couch, 554 S.E.2d at 359-60 (Depending on the circumstances, "[s]anctions
available include citations for contempt, censure, informing the North Carolina State Bar of the
misconduct, imposition of costs, suspension for a limited time of the right to practice before the
court, suspension for a limited time of the right to practice law in the State, and disbarment.")
(citing Inre Robinson, 247 S.E.2d 241,244 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978)); Gum v. Dudley, 505 S.E.2d 391,
404 (W. Va. 1997) (Sanctions for violating general duty of candor include but are not limited to:
"(1) ordering disclosure of information not disclosed, (2) granting a continuance, (3) holding
counsel in contempt, (4) precluding a party from calling a witness, offering evidence, or raising a
defense, (5) dismissal of a case, (6) declaring a mistrial, (7) imposing attorney's fees and litigation
costs, or (8) granting a new trial.").
197. See Couch, 544 S.E.2d at 360 (Because attorney in initial proceedings improperly
characterized veracity of opposing counsel and defense witnesses during closing argument and then
during hearings on sanctions for misconduct lied to court and failed to disclose previous disciplinary
action, sanctions included, among other things, revocation of current pro hac vice status in North
Carolina, suspension of practicing in the state for one year, attendance at continuing legal education
classes, attachment of copy of court's order to any motion to appear pro hac vice in North Carolina
for the next five years, referrals by copy of court's order to New York and Florida bars where she is
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judges, state court judges also have a wide range of informal sanctions at
their disposal. For example, they may use their considerable drafting
powers to publicize the misconduct and send a message1 98 or, more
minimally, rely
simply on communicating their concerns informally with
99
the lawyer.'
As in the federal courts, particular sanctions given in state courts
are likely due to a number of factors, including the specific
circumstances of each case, the type of misconduct being addressed, the
judge's own views on whether and how to address attorney behavior, the
history of the litigation and the particular stage in which the alleged
misconduct occurred, and the reputation of the attorney.0°
Courts apply sanctions with a variety of purposes in mind. For
example, in some instances, sanctions may be designed simply to
punish, while in others they are also used "to compensate the aggrieved
litigant for the actual loss incurred by the misconduct of the offending
party.",20 1 Courts may use sanctions as a means of deterrence 20 2 or to
protect the public from incompetent and unprofessional attorneys.20 3
Regardless of how active a court wants to be in regulating attorney
misconduct, courts generally appear to perceive that the most
appropriate remedy is one that focuses on the culpable attorney and not

licensed to practice, imposition of reasonable attorney fees, censure, and requirement that she report
the court's order of sanctions as an order of discipline when required to do so.).
198. See id. at 671 (publicizing misconduct can have a serious, intended effect on an attorney's
reputation); see also Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Briscoe, 745 A.2d 1037, 1044 (Md. 2000)
(sanctions may be used to "demonstrate[ ]to members of the legal profession the type of conduct
that will not be tolerated."); 5-H Corp., 708 So. 2d at 246 n.7 ("It is our hope that by publishing this
opinion and thereby making public the offending and demeaning exchanges between these
particular attorneys, that the entire bar will benefit.") (quoting Fla. Bar v. Martocci, 699 So. 2d
1357, 1360 (Fla. 1997)).
199. See, e.g., In re Eicher, 661 N.W. 2d 354, 370 (S.D. 2003) (noting that in circumstances
where the second clause of Canon 3D(2) is not invoked to require reporting, "[s]imple
communication with the lawyer satisfies the judge's ethical duty" to take appropriate action).
200. See, e.g., Gum, 505 S.E.2d at 404 ("Our review of the cases involving sanctions for
violating the general duty of candor, illustrate to us that there is no one sanction that fits all
situations. The facts of each case must be considered to establish an appropriate sanction. We
recognize that a violation ...may occur at any stage of the litigation process. As a result, the
particular litigation stage at which the violation occurred will play a strong role in determining an
appropriate sanction.").
201. Avelino-Wright v. Wright, 742 N.E.2d 578, 582 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001).
202. See, e.g., Briscoe, 745 A.2d at 1044 (By imposing the ultimate sanction of disbarment,
"the public interest is served when sanctions designed to effect general and specific deterrence are
imposed on an attorney who violates the disciplinary rules.").
203. See, e.g., In re Laprath, 670 N.W.2d 41, 66 (S.D. 2003).
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on the parties to the underlying litigation. 0 4 They believe that the
litigants should neither unduly benefit from 20 5 nor have to pay for an
attorney's misbehavior. 2° ' This is particularly true where the misconduct
has no adverse impact on the underlying proceedings.20 7 Where the
offensive conduct in fact tainted the litigation and undermined the
fairness of the trial, however, courts are willing to levy sanctions that go
beyond disciplining the attorney and impact the outcome of the case,
including vacating a verdict or even dismissing a criminal conviction.20 8
204. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 616 A.2d 288, 291-92 (Del. 1992) (citing direction from U.S.
Supreme Court precedent, the Delaware Supreme Court found dismissal of criminal action an
inappropriate remedy for prosecutorial misconduct in the absence of any prejudice to the defendant;
instead, courts should "impose a sanction, such as reprimand, disciplinary referral, or contempt,
which focuses on the culpable individual."); Suarez v. State, 481 So. 2d 1201, 1206-07 (Fla. 1986)
(finding that disciplinary sanction against prosecutor rather than suppression of defendant's
voluntary statement was appropriate remedy for prosecutor's unethical conduct).
205. See, e.g., Harris, 616 A.2d at 291-92 (finding that the sanction given should target the
offending attorney, in that case a prosecutor, "rather than granting a windfall to the unprejudiced
defendant" (quoting Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263 (1988))).
206. See, e.g., Fravel v. Haughey, 727 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (finding
that where the process was not tainted by improper prejudicial remarks of plaintiff's attorney, the
court is unwilling to punish litigants for the unethical comments of their lawyers; instead, the more
appropriate remedy should be referral of the attorney to the Bar); Clark v. Clark, 716 N.E.2d 144,
152 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (reminding trial judges that they should "avoid punishing a litigant for
his attorney's errors, when less drastic measures are available"); Covington v. Smith, 582 S.E.2d
756, 773-74 (W. Va. 2003) (Starcher, C.J., concurring) (encouraging courts to hesitate to punish
innocent litigants for the "positive misconduct" of their attorneys).
207. See Fravel, 727 So. 2d at 1036; Covington, 582 S.E.2d at 773-74; see also Bell v.
Seabury, 622 N.W.2d 347, 351-52 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (reversing trial court's vacating arbitral
award as a means to sanction the attorney who initially served as the mediator for both parties and
then acted as one of the party's counsel during arbitration after mediation failed, appellate court
underscored the lack of taint on proceedings); Spivey v. Bender, 601 N.E.2d 56, 59 (Ohio Ct. App.
1991) (In an apparent conflict of interest case, despite court's broad discretion in determining
whether to disqualify counsel, "[d]isqualification ... 'should ordinarily be granted only when a
violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility poses a significant risk of trial
taint."'(quoting Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc. 653 F.2d 756, 748 (1981))); State v. Wade, 839
A.2d 559, 559 (Vt. 2003) (finding that the trial court's dismissal of a conviction as a means to
sanction the state's attorney's office for an ongoing pattern of discovery abuse, was an abuse of
discretion because the misconduct did not prejudice defendant). This seems to be especially true in
criminal matters in which society, and in particular communities, have an important stake and
whose safety and interests in ensuring that the guilty are punished should not be jeopardized
because of prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., Harris, 616 A.2d at 292 (noting that the trial judge is
responsible for safeguarding the public interest in the administration of criminal justice); Gonzalez
v. State, 768 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing the public's concern that the guilty
are punished).
208. See, e.g., Quinones v. State, 766 So. 2d 1165, 1167, 1171-72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(granting of prosecutor's motion for mistrial upheld where defense counsel's "unethical" and
"contumacious" conduct undermined the fairness of the trial making it impossible for either the
state or the defendant to receive a fair trial); Badalamenti v. William Beaumont Hospital-Troy, 602
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These broader sanctions demonstrate that, as in the federal realm, state
courts are very concerned with running an efficient, fair, and impartial
courtroom and avoiding any taint on the proceedings that renders the
outcome suspect and unreliable.
Because of the varied and fact-intensive nature of these types of
cases, it is very difficult to discern trends among state courts associating
sanctions with particular types of conduct. It is clear, however, that when
the court feels that an attorney is purposely squandering judicial
resources, disrespecting the dignity of the court and proceedings, or
employing tactics designed to delay the proceedings and compel the
opposing party to incur20 9needless expense, sanctions will likely include
fines or attorneys' fees.
In addition, as discussed above, where the misconduct taints the
underlying proceedings, particularly in situations where an attorney
prejudices a jury against one of the parties by, for example, introducing
evidence in violation of court orders, making disparaging comments
about the opposing side or their arguments or failing to disclose
requested material information, courts generally will not hesitate to
render sanctions that impact the course of the underlying proceedings.2t °
These types of sanctions may include vacating criminal convictions,
granting motions for mistrial, or setting aside jury verdicts.

N.W.2d 854, 856 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that it was appropriate to set aside a verdict of $15
million where plaintiffs counsel's misconduct denied defendant fair trial); Wasielewski v. K Mart
Corp., 891 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (setting aside a verdict of $1.5 million where
attorney's conduct of raising evidence in contradiction to judge's rulings in motions in limine
unfairly prejudiced jury against the defendant); Lemons v. Commonwealth, 420 S.E.2d 525, 526
(Va. Ct. App. 1992) (vacating and remanding a murder conviction as a result of prosecutor's failure
to disclose important information as required).
209. See, e.g., Avelino-Wright v. Wright, 742 N.E.2d 578, 580-81 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001)
(finding that reasonable attorney fees may be imposed, after sufficient due process, against attorney
who directed her client not cooperate with GAL, challenged the integrity of the judge and appointed
court experts, filed 88 frivolous motions with intent of harass opposing party); Clark, 716 N.E.2d at
150-51 (stating that reasonable attorney fees may be imposed where attorney made disparaging
remarks towards opposing counsel and court and left trial on final day without permission); R&R
Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1080-81 (Utah 1997) (finding that $3500
in attorney fees was a reasonable sanction where attorney filed numerous pleadings with sole
purpose of harassing or causing unnecessary delay or needless increase in litigation costs); see also
Byrnes v. Baca, 54 P.3d 996, 1009 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding trial judge's sanction of $1000
fine against attorney where attorney disobeyed direct orders from the judge, incessantly disrupted
proceedings, badgered opposing counsel and witnesses, and insulted judge's case management
practices).
210. See related text and accompanying note 209.
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Suspension 2 1 and disbarment 21 2 through the state disciplinary apparatus
are reserved, generally, for the most egregious conduct, where the
attorney demonstrates ignorance of the law or lacks professional
competence.
State courts appear more inclined than their federal counterparts to
refer misconduct to the state bar when an attorney's conduct appears to
violate the rules of professional responsibility and places suspicion on an
attorney's ability to practice law ethically. Although acknowledged as a
practice judges resist, 2 13 state judges do occasionally refer attorney
misconduct to the state bar. Trial judges may report misconduct by, for
example, requesting a court clerk or opposing counsel to deliver a copy
of the court's order or opinion to the state bar.2t 4 Appellate court judges
may utilize their considerable drafting powers to articulate in very strong
language why they believe the conduct was wrongful as part of the
referral. 2 5 This allows the court to establish norms of conduct but leave
the specifics of the sanction to the formal disciplinary apparatus.

211. See, e.g., Couch v. Private Diagnostic Clinic, 544 S.E.2d 356, 365 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)
(noting that in light of other possible sanctions available, the level of the attorney's misconduct
required suspension); see also Fla. Bar v. Kravitz, 694 So. 2d 725, 726, 728-29 (Fla. 1997) (30-day
suspension and requirement to attend continuing legal education courses for attorney who presented
false evidence to court).
212. See, e.g., Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Briscoe, 745 A.2d 1037, 1039, 1041, 1043, 1045
(Md. 2000) (holding disbarment warranted where attorney represented client in criminal matter
while decertified, commingled client funds, and failed to produce requested records); In re Laprath,
670 N.W.2d 41, 54-55, 66 (S.D. 2003) (finding disbarment warranted where attorney lacks
professional competency, is ignorant of law and professional rules, and is unable to comprehend the
rules regarding when she is entitled to other people's money for fees); In re Stanton, 446 N.W.2d
33, 36-43 (S.D. 1989) (stating that disbarment is warranted where attorney demonstrates ignorance
of law, employs unconscionable delay tactics, lies to court, and betrays client confidences).
213. See R&R Energies, 936 P.2d at 1081 (Utah 1997) (Zimmerman, C.J., concurring)
(characterizing reluctance as "natural resistance to being perceived as troublemakers"); State v.
Wade, 839 A.2d 559, 565 (Vt. 2003) (Johnson, J. concurring) (noting reluctance on the part of
judges to report lawyers with whom they must work on a daily basis); see also Fravel v. Haughey,
727 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (finding it "troubling that trial judges are reluctant
to curb the abuse perpetrated by trial counsel in the area of improper comments made during closing
arguments").
214. See, e.g., Kravitz, 694 So. 2d at 726 (noting that the trial judge instructed opposing
counsel to deliver copy of contempt order to state bar); Couch, 554 S.E.2d at 360 (noting that the
judge reported pro hac vice attorney to both state bars in which she was licensed to practice).
215. See Quinones v. State, 766 So. 2d 1165, 1172 n.8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); R&R
Energies, 936 P.2d at 1081 (Zimmerman, C.J., concurring); Wade, 839 A.2d at 565-66 (Johnson, J.,
concurring); Covington v. Smith, 582 S.E.2d 756, 772 (W. Va. 2003); Gum v. Dudley, 505 S.E.2d.
391, 405 (W. Va. 1997); see also AIG Haw. Ins. Co. v. Bateman, 923 P.2d 395, 402 (Haw. 1996);
People v. Green, 274 N.W.2d 448, 455 (Mich. 1979) (William, J., concurring and dissenting); State
v. Hohman, 420 A.2d 852, 855 (Vt. 1980), overruled by Jones v. Shea, 532 A.2d 571 (Vt. 1987).
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As discussed above, sanctions are subject to appellate review,
usually pursuant to a relatively deferential standard such as "abuse of
discretion., 21 6 As noted above, while the decision to sanction is often
upheld, the nature of the sanction appears to undergo more scrutiny.
Courts must provide sufficient due process in determining the
appropriate sanction, requiring at a minimum, fair notice, sufficient
opportunity to be heard, and basis for the particular sanction levied.2 17
Moreover, very importantly, the particular sanction imposed must be
narrowly tailored to the specific misconduct at issue.218 For example,
although it is generally accepted that courts can assess a portion of
attorneys' fees as a sanction for misbehavior, the amount should be
tailored to the judicial resources wasted or unnecessarily expended as a
result of the misconduct. 21 9 This is true for other types of sanctions as
well.22 °
Occasionally we came across cases illustrating the courts'
reluctance to impose traditional sanctions on an attorney for
misconduct. 22' Despite strong dicta by which these courts criticize an
attorney's conduct, some cases fail to award sanctions even when
actions of the attorney are clearly unethical 22 2 and unprofessional. 223 A
216. See supra text accompanying note 168.
217. See supra text accompanying note 171.
218. See supra text accompanying note 170.
219. Compare Avelino-Wright v. Wright, 742 N.E.2d 578, 580 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001)
(remanding to trial court to determine reasonableness of $7,500 sanction where attorney, among
other things, filed 88 frivolous motions), and Clark v. Clark, 716 N.E.2d 144, 151 (Mass. App. Ct.
1999) (holding $14,000 excessive in light of attorney conduct, which consisted of disrespectful
behavior and disparaging remarks during course of trial and leaving the courtroom without
permission on the final day of trial), with R&R Energies, 936 P.2d at 1073, 1081 (finding sanction
of $3,500 in attorney fees reasonable where attorney disobeyed court discovery orders, filed
numerous pleadings and motions regarding matters previously settled by the court and filed other
motions simply to harass or cause unnecessary delays).
220. See, e.g., Byrnes v. Baca, 54 P.3d 996, 1007-08 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming
contempt order and $1,000 fine against attorney who repeatedly ignored the court's warnings and
disobeyed direct orders of the judge by disrupting and interrupting hearing, but reversed trial court's
permanent suspension of attorney, finding that such a harsh sanction did not fit the particular facts
of that case and leaving open altogether the question as to whether a trial court can even suspend an
attorney indefinitely).
221. The extent of reluctance is difficult, if not impossible, to measure, because courts
reluctant to address misconduct and impose sanctions most likely do not include such discussions in
their opinions or orders. The only time such reluctance is addressed formally is when a court
otherwise would sanction an attorney but for the particular circumstances of the case requiring them
to refrain from acting.
222. See Evans & Luptak, PLC v. Lizza, 650 N.W.2d 364, 373 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
223. See Neshat v. County of San Bernardino, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10646, at **2627 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss4/15

46

McMorrow et al.: Judicial Attitudes Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View

2004]

CONFRONTINGA TTORNEY MISCONDUCT

court may decide not to award traditional sanctions against an attorney
because of the lack of precedent or guidance regarding the conduct224 or
because an attorney raises his or her First Amendment free speech
rights225 or where the requested remedy would punish litigants for the
unethical conduct of their lawyers, particularly in cases where the
attorney's misconduct did not taint the proceedings.226
Reviewing opinions from various jurisdictions provides us with
some insight into judicial attitudes about and frustrations with attorney
misconduct and a court's responsibility as either a guardian of the
system or a regulator of attorney behavior. As with the federal courts,
state courts do not spend much time or rhetoric on explaining the basis
of their power; they simply assert it.
V.

CRITIQUE & CONCLUSION: WHAT WE DON'T KNOW

Judges control their courtrooms with an understanding that they
have not just the power but some responsibility to regulate the conduct
of attorneys that adversely affects the integrity of the judicial
proceeding. This role corresponds to the court's institutional
competence. Who better than the judge, who has often seen the conduct
or the consequences of it, to address the underlying ethical issues to the
extent that they have an impact on the administration of justice? 227 The
judicial emphasis in both federal and state courts on efficiency, fairness
and assuring the integrity of the proceeding before the court emphasized
this unique judicial competence. Courts appear interested in and willing
to regulate attorney conduct primarily where the conduct is strongly

224. See Evans, 650 N.W.2d at 373 (finding that although referral fee agreement by which
plaintiff-attorney would receive one-third of attorney fees realized in wrongful death action against
his own client was clearly unethical and in violation of rules of professional conduct, trial court did
not err in failing to award sanctions where no published opinion had ever ruled on the enforceability
of such agreements).
225. Compare Neshat, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10646, at **22-26 (public defender who
made inappropriate and disparaging sexual remarks against prosecutor protected by First
Amendment) with Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2647, at
*21 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003) ("[T]he significant state interest in preserving public confidence in the
judicial system outweighs the free speech rights of Notopoulos to make reckless accusations about
the integrity of a probate judge.").
226. See supra text accompanying notes 205-08.
227. See Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Ct., 53 F.3d 1349, 1361 (1st Cir. 1995) (the district
court judges "are in a position to observe the subpoena practices of attorneys appearing before
them").
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relevant to the court's core function of adjudicating decisions. 228 Both
federal and state courts may have broader power to regulate attorneys,
but they do not appear eager to embrace that power.
Inevitably courts also consider the relative institutional competence
of the other enforcement systems. 22 9 Formal disciplinary systems, such
as the state disciplinary body and federal court committees, have the
ability to provide the requisite due process and fact finding that might
otherwise consume significant judicial resources. They have
investigators to assist in fact finding. These formal systems can detect
patterns that may not be discernible to an individual judge.
In this article we have explored written opinions, the traditional
body of data available to those who study the legal profession, searching
out topics such as conflicts of interest, confidentiality, and contact with
represented persons and litigation misbehavior that goes beyond mere
accidental violation of rules of procedure. 230 From reading hundreds of
cases on legal ethics, it is manifestly evident that a great many issues are
not reflected in the published decisions. Only a small fraction of cases
filed in federal and state court will ever result in a court decision, and
even fewer of those result in written opinions that are reported and
available for distribution. 231 Even with reported decisions, judges have a
228. The advocate witness rule, which generally prohibits a lawyer from serving as both
advocate and witness, presents an interesting example of the intersection of fairness, efficiency and
legal ethics. Most courts that have addressed the issue conclude that the legal ethics rules do not
render the evidence inadmissible. When confronted with an advocate whose testimony is needed,
the court typically puts the truth-seeking function of admitting the evidence as the paramount
concern and uses procedural devices, including voluntary withdrawal or disqualification, to address
the resulting ethical issue. See Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Rubin, 510 N.E.2d 379, 380-82 (Ohio 1987).
See generally Judith A. McMorrow, The Advocate As Witness: UnderstandingCulture, Context and
Client, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 945 (2001).
229. Cf Bergeron ex rel Perez v. O'Neil, 74 P.3d 952, 964 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) ("Although
respondents may not view the avowal requirement coupled with the State Bar enforcement
mechanism as a perfect or adequate remedy for alleged violations of Rule 10.2(b), it is the remedy
our supreme court has chosen. Nothing in this record suggests that mechanism is ineffective,
unworkable, or somehow 'insulates the rule's continued misuse'...."); see also Zacharias &
Green, supra note 2, at 1374 ("federal judges exercising broad regulatory authority would be
assuming functions which they have neither the expertise, information, nor the resources to fulfill").
230. See generally MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 8; Green, Conflicts of Interest in
Litigation,supra note 2.
23 1. See generally Catherine Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The
Paradoxof Losing by Winning, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 869 (1999). See also Samuel R. Gross &
Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Gearedto Settlement, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 7 (1996); John Burritt McArthur, The Strange Case of American Civil Procedureand the
Missing Uniform Discovery Time Limits, 24 HOFSTRA L. REv. 865, 871 (1996). This phenomenon
results in a significant selection bias "because published opinions are not a representative sampling
of all cases." Ashenfelter, Eisenberg & Schwab, supranote 11, at 259.
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great deal of discretion in deciding what to include in a written opinion.
Because reported decisions generally focus on formal rule-based
violations, ethical issues that are resolved through informal means or
that are not addressed by clear rule violations are often not addressed.
We need a more systematic understanding of the range of judicial
attitudes exhibited by judges in their courtrooms-the behavior that
judges observe, and what action they take in response to those behaviors.
We need a better understanding of why judges impose varying sanctions
for similar behavior.23 2 From this understanding of what judges do, we
can develop a better understanding of how judges view the relationship
between the law of lawyering and judicial ethics and the variables that
appear to shape a judge's attitude (such as practice background,
experience and philosophy of judging). This, in turn, can yield insights
into judicial ethics, including the judge's ethical obligation to report
misconduct, judicial temperament, civility, and best practices in
rectifying imbalance in the quality of advocacy and pro se
representation.
We can gain significant benefits from looking more carefully at the
practices of judges. With a better understanding of judicial approaches to
legal ethics, we can develop more effective collaborations with judges to
reduce the incidents of unethical behavior by lawyers. Law professors
who teach legal ethics would gain hard data on the ethical issues that
arise in litigation, not merely
the arguably distorted picture that arises
fromrtddeciions 233
from reported decisions.
If we can teach our students just a little
better, and if judges can guide lawyers just a little more, and if the bar
and judges can work out a thoughtful allocation of responsibility, we
might collectively improve litigation practice. We need more knowledge
to achieve that goal.

232. See, e.g., MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 8, at §811.02[8] (varying sanctions
for failure to cite directly contrary authority). See generally Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes
and Other Tales About the Standardsfor Imposing Lawyer DisciplineSanctions, 48 AM. U.L. REV.

1 (1998); John D. Fabian and Brian Reinthaler, Comment, An Examination of the Uniformity (or
Lack ThereoJ) ofAttorney Sanctions, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 1059 (2001).

233. A comparison of federal and state judges could also provide sociologists of the legal
profession with a stronger understanding of the varying experiences of federal and state courts,
including insights into the existence of sub-communities of lawyers.
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